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A NEW DEAL FOR DEBTORS: PROVIDING
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY
PAMELA FOOHEY *
Abstract: Across the criminal and civil justice systems, research regarding procedural justice shows that people’s positive perceptions of legal processes are
fundamental to the legal system’s effectiveness and to the rule of law. Approximately one million people file bankruptcy every year, making the consumer
bankruptcy system the part of the federal court system with which the public
most often comes into contact. Given the importance of bankruptcy to American
families and the credit economy, there should exist a rich literature theorizing and
investigating how people’s perceptions of consumer bankruptcy’s procedures advance the system’s goals. Instead, bankruptcy’s procedures have received strikingly little scholarly attention. This Article begins to fill this significant gap by
combining procedural justice and related research with what is known about the
people who file bankruptcy to craft a theory of consumer bankruptcy’s procedural deficiencies. If consumer bankruptcy is procedurally bankrupt, as this Article
posits, then the “fresh start” delivered to struggling households is not nearly as
fresh as presumed, hampering people’s return to their communities and to the
credit economy. As such, this Article proposes two sets of changes to the consumer bankruptcy process—one modest and one more drastic. Both of these new
deals for debtors promise to enhance people’s perceptions of bankruptcy’s procedural justice and thereby the legitimacy of the system.

INTRODUCTION
Processes and procedures matter. In law, procedures really matter. Procedures protect individuals’ rights, 1 and procedural missteps can result in the ex© 2019, Pamela Foohey. All rights reserved.
* Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. My thanks to Jeannine Bell,
Kenworthey Bilz, Christopher Bradley, Matthew Bruckner, Andrew B. Dawson, Michelle Harner,
Sara Jane Hughes, Melissa Jacoby, Dalié Jiménez, Robert M. Lawless, Leandra Lederman, Jody L.
Madeira, Nathalie Martin, Christopher Odinet, Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Stephen Rushin, Amy J.
Schmitz, Michael D. Sousa, Jeffrey Stake, Jennifer Taub, Jay L. Westbrook, and participants at the
2018 Southeastern Association of Law Schools’ annual conference, Young Bankruptcy Scholars’
Work-in-Progress Workshop, 2016 Big Ten Untenured Law Faculty Conference, Seventh Annual
National Business Law Scholars Conference, 2016 Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, and
Maurer School of Law’s Summer Faculty Workshop Series for helpful comments and discussions.
Chelsea Brune, Paul Newendyke, and Joseph Pellegrino provided excellent research assistance.
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pulsion of an entire case from the legal system. 2 Such results deliver order and
convey integrity. Research shows that across the criminal and civil justice system, litigants value process and are more likely to respect courts’ decisions
when they think that the courts settled their disputes by way of a fair method,
even if they do not agree with the decisions. 3
In particular, people benefit from legal proceedings’ ability to allow them
to face their accusers, confront wrongdoers, and engage in “deliberative interaction” with their communities and with society.4 Courtroom hearings, arbitration proceedings, and mediations let individuals “vent their feelings, present
their side of the story,” and discuss “what can be done to restore a sense of justice.” 5 This interaction is part of what is termed the “expressive value” of law
and legal proceedings, 6 which connects with people’s perceptions of their
standing within society 7 and with their emotional reactions to major life
events. 8
“Procedural justice”—feeling that one has a voice, is respected, and is before a neutral and even-handed adjudicator—thereby brings legitimacy to the
legal system, 9 leading some to argue that legal procedures are more important
1
For example, criminal procedures include the right to trial by jury, to counsel, and to confront
and cross-examine witnesses. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1155 (1998) (noting doctrines of criminal procedure).
2
An interesting example is the City of Harrisburg’s chapter 9 bankruptcy case. After the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed the City’s petition for failure to meet
the Bankruptcy Code’s eligibility requirements to be a chapter 9 debtor, the City filed an appeal with
the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, but missed the filing deadline by three
days. The District Court dismissed the appeal. City of Harrisburg, Pa. v. AFSCME Dist. Council 90,
No. 1:11-BK-06938MDF, 2012 WL 315403 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2012).
3
See generally Edgar Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 177 (Austin Sarat et al. eds. 1998) (discussing
procedural justice); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 94–112 (1990) (noting how people’s experiences during proceedings influence perceptions of legitimacy).
4
Michael Wenzel et al., Retributive and Restorative Justice, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 375, 376–
77 (2008).
5
See id.; infra notes 94–119 and accompanying text (discussing voice and perceptions of procedural justice).
6
See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1363, 1414–27 (2000) (overviewing the expressive dimensions of law); infra notes 120–206 and accompanying text.
7
People naturally view themselves as occupying a distinct position within society’s social
groups, and people’s social identity can yield a sense of belonging, pride, and self-esteem. See Henri
Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Behavior, 13 SOC. SCI. INFO. 65, 69 (1974) (discussing social
identity); Tom Tyler et al., Understanding Why the Justice of Group Procedures Matters: A Test of
the Psychological Dynamics of the Group-Value Model, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 913,
913–14 (1996) (noting that people seek to be well-regarded group members); infra notes 120–140 and
accompanying text (discussing social standing and the legal system).
8
See infra notes 141–206 (discussing the emerging field of law and emotions).
9
Procedural justice generally refers to the perceived fairness of procedures. See Tyler et al., supra note 7, at 914 (defining procedural justice). See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE
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than substantive law. 10 At the very least, research shows that procedural justice
is crucial to the rule of law and fundamental to the legal system’s operation
and effectiveness. 11
The bankruptcy system is an integral part of the American legal system.
About one million people file consumer bankruptcy every year. 12 Cumulatively, these cases seek to discharge billions of dollars in debts and to grant a
“fresh start” to the individuals and families who file that hopefully will allow
them to regain their financial footing and re-enter the credit economy. 13 Based
on the number of petitions filed each year, the consumer bankruptcy system is
by far the part of the federal court system with which people most often come
into contact. 14 Likewise, every year, thousands of larger corporations and small
businesses seek to use the bankruptcy system to reorganize, with the hope of
curing defaults, getting back on track, and preserving value and jobs. 15
Given the importance of the bankruptcy system to American families and
to the economy, there should exist a rich literature theorizing and empirically
investigating how people’s perceptions of bankruptcy’s procedures advance the
bankruptcy system’s goals. Yet the procedures that govern bankruptcy cases
have received strikingly little scholarly attention. Procedural justice theory has

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (providing an overview of factors that lead
people to assess procedures as fair); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975) (establishing the foundations of procedural justice).
10
See Jeremy Lever, Why Procedure Is More Important Than Substantive Law, 48 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 285, 285 (1999) (arguing that procedural rules affect the outcome of cases more than
substantive law).
11
See Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 666–68 (2007) (linking the rule
of law to procedural justice).
12
U.S. COURTS, CASELOAD STATISTICS DATA TABLES [hereinafter CASELOAD STATISTICS],
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-data-tables [https://perma.cc/BK3N4XRL]. This rough estimate is based on nonbusiness bankruptcy cases commenced between 2008 and
2017, as reported in Table F-2. Nonbusiness bankruptcy filings peaked in 2010 at about 1.5 million
and steadily declined to a low of approximately 765,000 in 2017. See id. (providing consumer bankruptcy filing numbers).
13
The phrase “fresh start” comes from Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). See
infra notes 20–27 and accompanying text (discussing why people are granted the discharge).
14
See CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 12 (detailing the number of people filing for consumer
bankruptcy). Every year, the number of bankruptcy cases filed is about twice the number of other
cases filed in federal court. See generally U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics [https://
perma.cc/4ZKU-DAH4].
15
For example, there were 6,350 business chapter 11 filings in 2017. CASELOAD STATISTICS,
supra note 12. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 776–77, 787–89
(1987) (discussing competing theories of business bankruptcy).
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only recently begun to be applied to bankruptcy, and it appears that the theory
has been applied only in the business bankruptcy context. 16
That consumer bankruptcy’s procedures have remained unanalyzed from
a procedural justice perspective is a serious oversight. The individuals who file
bankruptcy may be more likely than business debtors to look to their cases’
processes and outcomes to assess their place in society and to deal with emotions arising from serious events in their lives that contributed to their need to
file. Research shows that consumer debtors overwhelmingly identify as middle-class, struggle to pay their debts for years before they turn to bankruptcy,
are severely overindebted when they file, report being pushed to file by creditors’ and debt collectors’ actions, and state that they felt shame for needing to
file. 17 Once they muster the strength to file, these people may look to their cas16
See generally Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 2533 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
56–67 (2011) (statement of Melissa B. Jacoby discussing venue laws applicable to chapter 11 cases);
Pamela Foohey, Jevic’s Promise: Procedural Justice in Chapter 11, 93 WASH. L. REV. ONLINE 128
(2018), http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1845/93WLRO128.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W98N-P2M2] (detailing how a recent Supreme Court decision may be relied on by
bankruptcy judges to provide more procedural justice in chapter 11); Melissa B. Jacoby, Corporate
Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1715 (2018) (noting issues of procedural justice in chapter
11 cases filed by large corporations); Jonathan C. Lipson, The Secret Life of Priority: Corporate Reorganization After Jevic, 93 WASH. L. REV. 631 (2018) (arguing that a recent Supreme Court decision
has severe implications for process in addition to substantive corporate bankruptcy law). Literature
about consent and control in chapter 11 also is related to issues of process and procedural justice. See,
e.g., Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J.
663 (2009) (discussing consent in the context of bankruptcy); Diane Lourdes Dick, The Bearish Bankruptcy, 52 GA. L. REV. 437 (2018) (exploring the use of debtor-in-possession financing to gain control
of restructuring and shut out other stakeholders); Diane Lourdes Dick, The Chapter 11 Efficiency
Fallacy, 2013 BYU L. REV. 759 (critiquing chapter 11’s emphasis on speed and efficiency); Melissa
B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 11, 96
TEX. L. REV. 673 (2018) (discussing value-allocation in bankruptcy); Edward J. Janger & Adam J.
Levitin, One Dollar, One Vote: Mark-to-Market Governance in Bankruptcy, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1857
(2019) (discussing how the market for bankruptcy claims affects procedure in chapter 11); Charles W.
Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 931 (2004) (arguing that bankruptcy is a type of civil procedure); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795 (2004) (discussing creditor control
in the recovery process). Scholars also have discussed the importance of process to value maximization in chapter 11. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106
MICH. L. REV. 1 (2007) (finding that recoveries in bankruptcy reorganizations were significantly
higher than those in going concern sales); Stephen J. Lubben, The “New and Improved” Chapter 11,
93 KY. L.J. 839 (2004) (criticizing the “control rights” theory of modern chapter 11 bankruptcies);
Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 728 (2010) (arguing that the Chrysler bankruptcy did not constitute good bankruptcy practice).
17
See Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter, & Deborah Thorne, Life in the
Sweatbox, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 219, 225–26, 236–41 (2018) [hereinafter Foohey et al., Sweatbox] (detailing how long people spend struggling with debts prior to filing bankruptcy and their paths
to filing); infra notes 56–89 and accompanying text. For this Article’s purposes, overindebted means
an “inability to repay all debts in full in the near future.” A. Mechele Dickerson, Over-Indebtedness,
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es, in part, as a way to publicly confirm their self-worth. 18 Indeed, if consumer
debtors did not expect their cases to speak to their standing within society,
their perceptions of the bankruptcy system would differ starkly from people’s
views of every other part of the American legal system.
This Article seeks to fill the gap in the literature by combining procedural
justice theory and related research with what is known about the people who
file bankruptcy to evaluate the state of consumer bankruptcy’s procedural justice and, based on this assessment, to propose changes to consumer bankruptcy’s procedures to strengthen its capacity to achieve the system’s goals. Current literature about consumer bankruptcy’s mechanics focuses almost exclusively on why people should be afforded a discharge of most of their debts—
that is, the system’s goals. 19 But if people do not receive what they expect from
the bankruptcy process, they may not maximize the discharge’s theorized benefits, meaning that the system may not function as expected and may be in
need of revisions.
The most pervasive justification for affording people a “fresh start” is that
this relief allows them to remain economically productive members of society. 20 Bankruptcy’s discharge ensures that they continue working, spending, and
borrowing, thereby promoting the credit economy. 21 Importantly, this view of
the bankruptcy process does not focus on how people’s experiences in bankruptcy shape their view of themselves, and, concomitantly, the bankruptcy system’s legitimacy.

the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, and the Effect on U.S. Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 395, 396 n.1
(2009).
18
See infra notes 120–206 and accompanying text (discussing emotions and filing bankruptcy).
19
Not all debts are discharged in bankruptcy. See infra notes 94–119 and accompanying text.
20
Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 121, 140, 148–53 (2004)
(overviewing the competing justifications put forth for the consumer bankruptcy system).
21
See, e.g., KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 99 (1997) (“[W]e want debtors to be able to continue borrowing if they put themselves in the
position to be able to repay what they owe their creditors.”); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy
Law for Productivity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51, 53 (2002) (“The fresh start policy prevents pauperism and idleness.”); Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1047, 1085 (1987) (“[M]andating [conditional debt relief] comes down to a diminution of the
goal of economic productivity.”); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1433 (1985) (describing the economic benefits of allowing people to discharge
their debts in terms of human capital); Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 68 (2006) (discussing the “new opportunity in life” that
supposedly accompanies the fresh start); Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer
Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 483, 492 (1997) (“[Americans] need the chance to remain productive members of society, not driven underground or into joblessness by unpayable debt.”). Relatedly,
the bankruptcy process is viewed as an educational experience during which people acquire financial
knowledge that will assist them in managing debts going forward. See Howard, supra, at 1060 (discussing bankruptcy as an educational tool).
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The discharge also is seen as a form of social insurance. The bankruptcy
system catches individuals who, because of an incomplete social safety net,
have taken on debt to pay necessary expenses, such as healthcare. 22 Similarly,
shifting the risk of default to creditors should incentivize creditors to lend with
more discretion, which will decrease the risk of default and, with it, consumers’ use of bankruptcy. 23
Finally, some scholars have justified the “fresh start” on a humanitarian
basis. Society’s sanctioning of a law that relieves debtors of burdensome debts
evidences both creditors’ and society’s compassion and virtue. 24 Forgiving
debtors may have “restorative” benefits for creditors, debtors, and society
broadly. 25
22
See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Consumer Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh Start or
Treadmill?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1065, 1072–73 (2004) (linking social programs and the typical
consumer who files bankruptcy to suggest that these people initially self-finance their safety nets with
credit cards); Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 129–31 (2005) (noting that bankruptcy is an “insurer of last resort”);
Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts from the Ill and the Injured: The Rhetorical Significance, but
Practical Irrelevance, of Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 229, 233–35 (2001) (describing bankruptcy as an important part of the health care finance system); Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of Class Position, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 591 (2009) (“In
the absence of savings, a living wage or public assistance, credit becomes what enables many families
to survive.”).
23
See Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 981–83
(1981) (discussing discharge as allocating risk of loss between debtor and creditor); Jackson, supra
note 21, at 1426 (noting that discharge “leaves the determination of whether to extend credit to creditors . . . who are better able, by observing individual debtors or by employing specific contractual
covenants, to monitor individuals’ consumption of credit”); John A. E. Pottow, Private Liability for
Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 431–34 (discussing why it is more efficient to
shift risk of default to creditors). See generally Shu-Yi Oei, Taxing Bankrupts, 55 B.C. L. REV. 375
(2014) (defending the priority of tax claims in bankruptcy due, in part, to the fact that the government
is less able to manage the risk of debtor default).
24
See, e.g., GROSS, supra note 21, at 93–94 (articulating the discharge as “forgiveness”); Heidi
M. Hurd, The Virtue of Consumer Bankruptcy, in A DEBTOR WORLD: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON DEBT 217, 217–18 (Ralph Brubaker et al. eds., 2012) (articulating “a new positive theory”
of the discharge that posits that debt forgiveness is “about achieving and expressing personal virtue—
not that of creditors or of debtors . . . but of our own, as citizens of a just and wealthy society”); Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for the Financial Rehabilitation of the
Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515, 519–21 (1991) (positing that consumer bankruptcy
law is grounded in a “natural law theory of morality” that combines “attributes of social, distributive,
and commutative justice, existing in harmony as a humanitarian response to the financially downtrodden”); Jacoby, supra note 22, at 239 (noting the altruistic basis of the discharge). Thomas Jackson’s
theories for the discharge of debts, premised on “volitional and cognitive justifications,” can be
viewed in a humanitarian light: they are premised on the idea that debtors collectively would want
society to allow them to be relieved from debts they incurred without fully thinking the deals through
because of “impulse control” issues and cognitive defects. See generally Jackson, supra note 21, at
1405–18 (discussing justifications for the discharge).
25
See GROSS, supra note 21, at 94 (linking forgiveness and restoration); see also Hurd, supra
note 24, at 218 (“When debtors are rightly forgiven, it is under circumstances in which all those to

2304

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 60:2297

The humanitarian theory offers insights into the role of forgiveness in society through the legal system that procedural justice and related theories consider. 26 Assessing procedural justice in the context of bankruptcy, however,
requires additional focus on debtors. Also, applying procedural justice theory’s
tenets to consumer debtors does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
debtors are “wrongdoers” who need the discharge’s forgiveness to “regain selfesteem.” 27 On the contrary, research about the people who file bankruptcy suggests that some seek to assert their never lost self-esteem through their bankruptcy cases. 28
More fundamentally, evaluating the consumer bankruptcy process
through the lens of procedural justice and related theories does not seek to explain why bankruptcy provides the discharge. Rather, it explains what people
expect to gain from the bankruptcy system, the receipt of which should encourage them to maximize the discharge’s benefits. 29 Understanding how people anticipate their bankruptcy cases will proceed is essential to knowing if the
discharge actually is being used to produce its theorized benefits. By linking
several strands of research relevant to, but previously not applied to, consumer
bankruptcy, this Article describes a way in which people can benefit from
bankruptcy that is not reflected in its procedures. This sets the stage for crafting proposals to strengthen consumer bankruptcy’s procedures, which, in turn,
should enhance how America’s credit economy operates.
This Article’s examination of consumer bankruptcy’s procedures is descriptive and normative. To situate the Article, Part I reviews consumer bankruptcy’s mechanics and examines which people actually file bankruptcy. Part II
sets forth the Article’s theoretical framework grounded in procedural justice
theory and people’s expression of social standing and emotions through the
legal system. It then applies this framework to consumer bankruptcy to analyze
people’s perceptions of bankruptcy’s procedures.
Part II concludes by asserting that consumer bankruptcy, in effect, is procedurally bankrupt. Its current procedures bear almost none of the hallmarks of
whom their debts are owed ought to forgive their debts, and all those to whom the costs of their default are passed ought to be willing to shoulder those losses.”).
26
See GROSS, supra note 21, at 98–103 (linking the discharge and theories of criminal law, particularly the restorative justice and dignity rationales).
27
Id. at 94.
28
See infra notes 120–206 and accompanying text.
29
The theory developed in this Article is distinct from Donald Korobkin’s theory about how
bankruptcy is performative, as put forth in Bankruptcy Law, Ritual, and Performance, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 2124 (2003). To the extent that this Article’s discussion draws on the performance inherent in
legal proceedings, it does so in connection with the social benefits that debtors believe they will receive from the bankruptcy process, not what society requires of debtors. See id. at 2127–28 (discussing legal scholars’ exploration of performativity).
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the legal processes that litigants and the public find to provide procedural justice, the opportunity to affirm social standing, and the chance to deal with the
emotions that arise from legal problems. In addition, the profile of the people
who file bankruptcy from Part I suggests that consumer debtors should highly
value finding procedural integrity in bankruptcy. Participating in a process they
view as procedurally deficient may negatively impact their motivation to make
the most of their cases’ outcomes.
In light of this conclusion, Part III proposes two “new deals” for consumer debtors that are designed to address the system’s procedural justice deficiencies. One proposal takes a more modest approach based on the idea that a few
small changes to consumer bankruptcy’s procedures are more legislatively feasible. The other proposal abandons the constraint of legislative feasibility and
reimagines the consumer bankruptcy system. As a bonus, both proposals address other long-standing problems with the consumer bankruptcy system that
have hampered its ability to deliver the fresh start to struggling households.
The Article closes by offering an empirical framework to further test consumer
bankruptcy’s procedural justice.
I. A PRIMER ON THE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
People file bankruptcy based on what benefits they think the system will
provide them. It is thus important to understand how the consumer bankruptcy
system works and who files bankruptcy. This Part first provides a primer on
the consumer bankruptcy system’s mechanics and then details research about
who files bankruptcy. 30
A. How People Are Granted the Discharge
Debtors initiate almost all consumer bankruptcy cases in the United
States, 31 and most consumer debtors file with the help of an attorney. 32 Consumers predominantly file under two “chapters” of the Bankruptcy Code:
chapter 7 and chapter 13. 33 Each of these chapters can be thought of as providing for a particular deal between debtors and their creditors.
30

See infra notes 31–89 and accompanying text.
See Foohey et al., supra note 17, at 226 (providing an overview of bankruptcy).
32
See id. at 229 (finding that 90.1% of all debtors in a sample of households who filed chapter 7
or 13 between 2013 and 2016 employed an attorney to file their bankruptcy cases).
33
Consumers also may file chapter 11, which provides for reorganization of debts. See ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 294 (7th ed. 2014) (discussing consumer chapter 11 filings). The vast majority of people file chapter 7 or 13. For example, in 2015,
819,760 nonbusiness bankruptcy petitions were filed and 1,111 of them were chapter 11 petitions. See
CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 12 (depicting bankruptcy petitions in 2015). The discussion thus
focuses on chapters 7 and 13.
31
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People who file chapter 7 receive a relatively speedy discharge of most of
their debts in exchange for surrendering their assets to a bankruptcy trustee,
who sells those assets and distributes the proceeds to the debtor’s creditors.34
In practice, more than 90% of consumers’ chapter 7 cases are “no asset” cases,
meaning that there are no assets for the trustee to sell. 35 The reason for this is
two-fold. First, because state law and the Code protect (“exempt”) certain assets from liquidation, such as some clothing and household items, many debtors are allowed to retain all of their assets to effectuate their fresh start. 36 Second, many people have pledged most of their assets as collateral to their creditors; pledged (“secured”) assets are not available for liquidation by the bankruptcy trustee. 37
Most debtors who file chapter 7 are granted a discharge within six months
of filing and do not go to court or meet the bankruptcy judge. 38 All debtors
who file are required to sit for a hearing conducted by the bankruptcy trustee,
however, during which the trustee questions them about their finances and
creditors also may question the debtors.39 In both chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases, bankruptcy trustees are almost always private attorneys who serve as trustees through appointment to particular cases by the Department of Justice’s
United States Trustee Program. 40 This program also employs full-time attor34
See Jean Braucher, Dov Cohen, & Robert M. Lawless, Race, Attorney Influence, and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 393, 394 (2012) (describing chapter 7).
35
See id. (defining “no asset” cases); Dalié Jiménez, The Distribution of Assets in Consumer
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Cases, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 795, 797 (2009) (finding that 93% of people who
filed under chapter 7 in 2007 entered bankruptcy with no distributable assets).
36
See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2012) (listing federal exemptions); Braucher et al., supra note 34, at 394
(discussing exemptions).
37
See Braucher et al., supra note 34, at 394 (discussing secured creditors); Jiménez, supra note
35, at 801 (noting that “[s]ecured creditors are the real winners in the bankruptcy game”).
38
See Braucher et al., supra note 34, at 394, 425 n.12 (describing chapter 7 and noting that bankruptcy judges only conduct hearings when disputes arise); Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An
Empirical Study of Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 103, 153 (2011) [hereinafter Porter, The
Pretend Solution] (noting that the chapter 7 discharge rate exceeds 95%).
39
See 11 U.S.C. § 343 (requiring debtors to attend the hearing); Katherine Porter, Driven by
Debt: Bankruptcy and Financial Failure in American Families, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS
THE MIDDLE CLASS 1, 1–2 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012) [hereinafter Porter, Driven by Debt] (describing this hearing).
40
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRIVATE TRUSTEE INFORMATION [hereinafter PRIVATE TRUSTEE INFORMATION], https://www.justice.gov/ust/private-trustee-information [https://perma.cc/EJ6X-NNNZ]
(describing the role of private trustees in the bankruptcy system); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. TRUSTEE
PROGRAM, https://www.justice.gov/ust [https://perma.cc/7999-Z2XZ] (describing the U.S. Trustee
Program). In the six judicial districts of Alabama and North Carolina, bankruptcy administrators similarly oversee the administration of chapter 7 and 13 cases. See U.S. COURTS, TRUSTEES AND ADMINISTRATORS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/trustees-and-administrators [https://
perma.cc/4JKD-PUAK] (discussing bankruptcy administrators). Because these administrators’ duties
are substantively similar to private trustees’ roles, this Article’s discussion of chapter 7 and 14 trustees
includes bankruptcy administrators.
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neys, known as United States Trustees, who supervise private trustees and ensure the bankruptcy system’s overall efficiency and integrity. 41
The hearings during which trustees question debtors are called the “meeting[s] with creditors” or “341 meetings” after the controlling Code section. 42
They are recorded, may be remembered by debtors “as one of the most painful
moments of their lives,” 43 and are the foremost means by which debtors tell the
story of how they ended up in bankruptcy. These meetings effectively are consumer debtors’ “day in court.”
In contrast, chapter 13 is a lengthy and more complicated proceeding. In
exchange for a discharge of most of their debts, people must devote all of their
disposable income for three to five years to paying their creditors through a
repayment plan approved by the bankruptcy court. 44 Debtors receive the discharge only after they make all payments required under the plan. 45 Like debtors who file chapter 7, chapter 13 debtors are unlikely to go to court or meet
the bankruptcy judge. Instead, their attorneys handle the court hearings. These
debtors’ day in court also is the 341 meeting, which proceeds in the same way
as in a chapter 7 case. 46
People may file chapter 13 for a variety of reasons. Chief among these
reasons is that chapter 13 allows debtors to retain all their assets, regardless of
whether those assets are exempt or secured, 47 such as their homes. 48
The Code also moderates access to chapters 7 and 13, in part to assure
that only honest but unfortunate debtors are afforded a fresh start. 49 Following
41
See PRIVATE TRUSTEE INFORMATION, supra note 40 (describing the role of private trustees in
the bankruptcy system).
42
See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (requiring and describing the meeting with creditors).
43
Porter, Driven by Debt, supra note 39, at 2; see Nathalie Martin, Poverty, Culture and the
Bankruptcy Code: Narratives from the Money Law Clinic, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 203, 214 (2005)
(describing the palpable nervousness and shame of people seeking to file bankruptcy).
44
See Braucher et al., supra note 34, at 394 (describing chapter 13).
45
See id.
46
11 U.S.C. § 341; see Porter, The Pretend Solution, supra note 38, at 117–18 (discussing the
mechanics of chapter 13, including the role of the bankruptcy trustee).
47
See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
48
See Braucher et al., supra note 34, at 395 (“It is widely believed among consumer bankruptcy
specialists that a client’s desire to save a home is the most common reason for filing Chapter 13
. . . .”); Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter, & Deborah Thorne, “No Money Down”
Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1063 n.37 (2017) [hereinafter Foohey et al., “No Money
Down”] (explaining when debtors may retain encumbered property in chapter 7); Porter, The Pretend
Solution, supra note 38, at 133–36 (reporting that almost 90% of chapter 13 debtors indicated that
keeping their house was a very important goal when filing for bankruptcy, and that, for over 50% of
the debtors, it was their most important goal).
49
The Code’s provisions regarding access to bankruptcy can be viewed as a response to the
“moral hazard” problem that accompanies lending. See Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving
Up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289, 293 (2010) (discussing how credit economies rely on debtors’
promises that they will pay back funds extended and how the law must incentivize repayment).
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the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005 (BAPCPA), 50 the Code does this by using a “means test” that evaluates
a debtor’s ability to repay creditors based on monthly income, expenses, and
outstanding debts. 51 If the means test’s formula deems a debtor’s monthly income less expenses sufficient to repay a large enough portion of outstanding
debts, the debtor must file chapter 13 or not at all. 52 Although one of the stated
purposes of the means test is to curtail perceived abuses of bankruptcy by people who supposedly could pay their debts by requiring these debtors to file
chapter 13, 53 it has not resulted in a shift in the relative percentage of households filing chapter 7 and 13. 54 Section B explains the reasons for this by detailing exactly which individuals and families file bankruptcy. 55
B. Who Files Bankruptcy?
The means test and other provisions of BAPCPA that made bankruptcy
more expensive and time consuming were enacted in response to popular conceptions of when and why people file bankruptcy. 56 BAPCPA’s proponents
painted a picture of profligate and cunning consumers who filed “bankruptcies
of convenience” after racking up unwarranted expenses that they never intend-

50
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 707,
119 Stat. 23 (2005). BAPCA had an effective date of October 17, 2005. Id.
51
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2012).
52
See Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer
Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 352–53 (2008) (discussing the means test); Porter, The Pretend
Solution, supra note 38, at 119 (providing further analysis on the means test); Charles Jordan Tabb,
The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 1–2 (2001)
(foreseeing that BAPCPA would leave debtors with “the Hobson’s choice of foregoing bankruptcy
relief altogether or attempting to ‘repay their creditors . . .’ in a chapter 13 repayment plan”).
53
See A. Mechele Dickerson, Consumer Over-Indebtedness: A U.S. Perspective, 43 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 135, 144–45 (2008) (noting that BAPCPA evidences a policy closer to the “concept of an
‘earned’ rather than ‘fresh’ start”); Lawless et al., supra note 52, at 351–52, 378 (discussing which
debtors BAPCPA’s means test was meant to target); infra note 56 and accompanying text.
54
See Porter, The Pretend Solution, supra note 38, at 116, 119 (overviewing filing statistics).
55
See infra notes 56–89 and accompanying text.
56
See Angela Littwin, Adapting to BAPCPA, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 183, 183–87 (2016) (overviewing BAPCPA’s changes to the Bankruptcy Code that “appeared likely to impair the consumer bankruptcy system’s ability to function”); Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study: Final
Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 27 (2012) (noting BAPCPA’s goals).
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ed to pay. 57 Proponents linked supposed strategic filings to a purported drastic
decline in bankruptcy’s stigma. 58
For example, as synthesized by Mechele Dickerson, the typical filer is
nothing short of a “bankruptcy queen”—
the owner of a multi-million dollar exempt mansion, [who] charges
lavish trinkets on a Visa card (or takes a cash advance from the credit card to fund a gambling trip to Reno), then cavalierly files for
bankruptcy rather than selling the exempt assets, curtailing spending
habits, or working to repay the credit card debt. 59
Those who championed this characterization went so far as to claim that the
“rising tide of bankruptcy filings” caused by this cavalier spending cost every
hardworking, billpaying, upstanding family $400 a year. 60
None of the claims made by BAPCPA’s supporters were substantiated by
evidence, including the claims that bankruptcy’s stigma had declined, 61 and
that rising filings cost every family $400 annually. 62 Rather, decades of empirical research about the people who file bankruptcy show that most people turn
to bankruptcy for help after experiencing shocks to income or expenses, with
job loss, divorce, and medical expenses underlying the vast majority of filings. 63 Most of these data come from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP),
57
See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 375, 376–77, 391 (discussing debates about BAPCPA); see also Foohey et al., Sweatbox,
supra note 17, at 229–32 (discussing the debates leading up to BAPCPA); Katherine Porter, Bankrupt
Profits: The Credit Industry’s Business Model for Postbankruptcy Lending, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1369,
1371–78 (2008) (overviewing the “strategic behavior” model of bankruptcy and the debates that led to
BAPCPA’s passage).
58
See A. Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology, & Beyond, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1861, 1891–92 (2006) (noting that BAPCPA’s supporters “suggest[] that debtors
lacked integrity because they no longer felt any personal obligation to pay debts they could afford to
repay”); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of
the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 214 (2006) (“The primary
justification for this wholesale revision of the accessibility of the consumer bankruptcy system has
been the repeated claim that the extraordinary increase in bankruptcy filings is the consequence of
declining stigma.”).
59
A. Mechele Dickerson, America’s Uneasy Relationship with the Working Poor, 51 HASTINGS
L.J. 17, 48–49 (1999).
60
Elizabeth Warren, The Phantom $400, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 77, 77 (2004) [hereinafter
Warren, Phantom].
61
See Michael D. Sousa, Bankruptcy Stigma: A Socio-Legal Study, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 435,
463–79 (2013) (interviewing people who filed chapter 7 about bankruptcy’s stigma); Sullivan et al.,
supra note 58, at 218 (arguing that bankruptcy’s stigma likely increased, not decreased, over time).
62
Warren, Phantom, supra note 60, at 77, 79–80.
63
See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 2
(2000) (noting that five sources of financial stress lead to bankruptcy); ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE
GOING BROKE 81 (2003) (“Nearly nine out of ten families with children cite just three reasons for
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the long-term, multi-researcher effort that investigates the people who file
bankruptcy. 64
Data from the CBP further show that the households that file bankruptcy
predominately are middle-class, based on education, occupation, and home
ownership, even if their current incomes are not consistent with middle-class
status. 65 What distinguishes households that file bankruptcy from their nonfiling counterparts is debt and an accompanying lack of resources to deal with
debts. In the CBP’s latest iteration, the median household entered bankruptcy
with a little over $100,000 in debts, compared to a median monthly income of
about $2,650. 66 Assuming (unrealistically) that these households committed all
of their income to repaying their debts, it would take them about two and a half
years to do so. 67
CBP data also have long shown that people struggle to pay their debts for
years before they turn to bankruptcy courts for help. The CBP asks debtors:
“Before you filed bankruptcy, how long did you seriously struggle with your
debts?” 68 In the latest iteration, which includes people who filed between 2013
and 2016, two-thirds of households reported struggling with their debts for two
or more years, and almost one-third (30%) reported struggling for five or more
years. 69 On average, people reported that they struggled for more than three
years before filing. 70
Additionally, the length of people’s pre-bankruptcy struggles has increased. In the CBP’s prior iteration, which included debtors who filed in
their bankruptcies: job loss, family breakup, and medical problems.”); Lawless et al., supra note 52, at
378–79 (discussing whether post-BAPCPA filing data support the “strategic actor” vision of debtors
or the view that “exogenous shocks” drive filings).
64
Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook launched the CBP in the
1980s. See Robert M. Lawless & Angela Littwin, Local Legal Culture from R2D2 to Big Data, 96
TEX. L. REV. 1353, 1353–54 (2018) (discussing the CBP). The other co-principal investigators on the
CBP’s current iteration are Robert Lawless, Katherine Porter, and Deborah Thorne. For details about
the CBP, see Foohey et al., “No Money Down,” supra note 48, at 1071–74 (discussing the origin of
the CBP). I am a co-principal investigator on the CBP’s current iteration.
65
See Elizabeth Warren & Deborah Thorne, A Vulnerable Middle Class: Bankruptcy and Class
Status, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 25, 36–38 (Katherine Porter ed.,
2012) (“People in bankruptcy . . . reflect a class status that is much like their [middle-class] counterparts around the country.”); Foohey et al., Sweatbox, supra note 17, at 234–35; Lars Lefgren & Frank
McIntyre, Explaining the Puzzle of Cross-State Differences in Bankruptcy Rates, 52 J.L. & ECON.
367, 370 (2009) (noting that consumer bankruptcy filing rates “are most common in zip codes with
many households with incomes between $30,000 and $60,000”—that is, the middle class).
66
See Foohey et al., Sweatbox, supra note 17, at 234–35 (describing the lengthy struggles of
debtors in the “sweatbox”).
67
This calculation is based on the debt-to-income ratio of people in the CBP’s current iteration.
See id. at 239 tbl.1.
68
Id. at 235–36.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 236.
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2007, households reported struggling for an average of just under two and a
half years. 71 In the span of just one decade, people have indicated that they
waited ten months longer to file bankruptcy. 72 And this is a continuation of a
trend. In the CBP’s iteration in 2001, about one-third of debtors indicated that
they struggled for two or more years prior to filing bankruptcy. 73
In short, people do not file soon after experiencing the financial shocks
that ultimately land them in bankruptcy court. During the years that they try to
pay their mounting debts, CBP data show that the people who eventually file
bankruptcy try to work with their creditors by selling or pawning property to
pay their debts. These people also go without necessities, such as food, utilities, and, perhaps most concerningly, medical attention and other healthcarerelated expenses. 74 While they struggle, they report enduring sleepless nights
and arguments with spouses about how to deal with their financial situations. 75
Also, a majority of debtors indicate that pressure from debt collectors influenced their eventual filings. 76 The longer people report struggling, the more
likely they are to say that pressure from debt collectors pushed them to file
bankruptcy. 77 Among those people who struggle with their debts for two or
more years, more than 80% cite pressure from debt collectors as a reason for
their filings. 78 And the longer people struggle, the more likely they are to arrive
in bankruptcy court with a lien attached to their real property 79 or to have an
actual debt collection action filed against them before filing.80 Still, when peo-

71

Id. at 236–37.
Id. at 236.
73
Id. at 237. The increase in time that people report struggling between the 2001 and 2007 iterations of the CBP likely is connected in large part to BAPCPA’s enactment. See Lawless et al., supra
note 52, at 353 (noting that the means test effectively was “a barricade, blocking out hundreds of
thousands of struggling families indiscriminately”).
74
Foohey et al., Sweatbox, supra note 17, at 241–44.
75
See Deborah Thorne, Women’s Work, Women’s Worry? Debt Management in Financially Distressed Families, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 136, 136–38, 140–43, 151–
52 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012) (investigating how debt is experienced as more stressful by women);
Porter, The Pretend Solution, supra note 38, at 142–44 (noting that “[b]y the time they file bankruptcy, debtors have often endured months of dunning and threats of legal action,” and discussing how
that causes stress and arguments).
76
Foohey et al., Sweatbox, supra note 17, at 245–46.
77
Id. at 246.
78
See id. at 245 tbl.4 (reporting that 81.2% of debtors who struggled for more than two years
prior to filing, versus 69.7% of debtors who struggled for less than two years, cited pressure from debt
collectors as a reason for their bankruptcy filings).
79
See id. at 239 tbl.1 (reporting that 66.4% of debtors who struggled for more than two years
prior to filing, versus 50.9% of other debtors who struggled for less than two years and who owned
homes, arrived at bankruptcy court with an involuntary lien against their home).
80
See id. (reporting that 50.3% of debtors who struggled for more than two years prior to filing,
versus 35.6% of other debtors, had a collection action filed against them prior to filing).
72
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ple, particularly those who struggle the longest, eventually turned to bankruptcy courts for help, about 65% indicate that they felt shame upon filing. 81
Nationwide on average, two-thirds of households file chapter 7 and onethird file chapter 13. 82 The reason that these percentages have remained steady
through BAPCPA’s passage and the introduction of the means test relates in
large part to the financial situations of households that file bankruptcy. Based
on the means test, almost 90% of debtors who file chapter 13 are eligible to
file chapter 7. 83
Research shows that the chapter a household files has to do with the culture of filings in the debtor’s judicial district, 84 the debtor’s race, 85 and when
the debtor must pay attorney’s fees. 86 Tellingly, interviews with debtors reveal
that many do not even consider the trade-offs between filing chapter 7 and
chapter 13. 87
Bankruptcy thus is a “last refuge” for stressed and struggling individuals
and families, and filing is not a carefully thought out, long-planned decision. 88
Instead, declining income, selling property, dealing with debt collection calls,
being sued over delinquent debts, watching involuntary liens attach to homes,
and managing stress converge prior to people’s bankruptcy filings. Accounting
for these dynamics is key to evaluating what people expect from the bankruptcy system’s procedures. The next Part combines this knowledge about the people who file bankruptcy with research about what people seek from the legal
system to assess consumer bankruptcy’s procedures. 89
81
See id. at 249 (finding that 71.1% of debtors who report struggling with debts for two or more
years, versus 61.8% of other debtors, indicated that they felt shame upon filing bankruptcy).
82
See Braucher et al., supra note 34, at 396 (reporting that the 2010 national average of chapter
13 petitions was 31.7% of all bankruptcy petitions); Foohey et al., “No Money Down,” supra note 48,
at 1063 n.36 (noting that 34.4% of the sampled cases filed in 2013–2014 were chapter 13 cases).
83
See ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., supra note 33, at 258, 276–80 (discussing the means test and
chapter 7 eligibility).
84
For instance, in 2010, the percentage of consumers who filed under chapter 7 versus 13 varied
drastically across the United States, from a low of 4.9% filing under chapter 13 to a high of 74.1%
filing under chapter 13. See Braucher et al., supra note 34, at 396 (discussing these statistics). Scholars link these variances to “local legal culture.” Id. at 395–97.
85
See generally id. (establishing that black debtors are more likely to file chapter 13 than other
similarly situated debtors); Edward R. Morrison & Antoine Uettwiller, Consumer Bankruptcy Pathologies, 173 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 174 (2017) (finding that black households in
Chicago are more likely to file chapter 13, in part because of parking tickets).
86
See generally Foohey et al., “No Money Down,” supra note 48 (finding that some debtors
appear to file under chapter 13 because they can pay attorney’s fees over time rather than upfront and
linking that outcome to racial disparities in regional chapter 13 filing rates).
87
See Porter, The Pretend Solution, supra note 38, at 119 (noting that of interviewed debtors who
file under chapter 13, “only about half (47%) of all debtors even considered Chapter 7”).
88
See Foohey et al., Sweatbox, supra note 17, at 255 (finding that bankruptcy is not a “first resort” for debtors).
89
See infra notes 90–224 and accompanying text.
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II. IS CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURALLY BANKRUPT?
The legal system’s procedures carry meanings, in part providing ways for
people to assert their identities. Procedures shape people’s confidence in
courts, their willingness to defer to judicial decisions, and their view of their
place in communities and society. This Part applies the lessons of procedural
justice, the expressive function of procedures, and the emotions surrounding
legal proceedings to the consumer bankruptcy system. 90 Through this analysis,
this Article crafts a theory of how the people who seek bankruptcy protection
view the system that they turn to for help. How consumer debtors experience
bankruptcy courts almost certainly affects how they enter the credit economy
after bankruptcy, which in turn impacts the economy as a whole.
Section A introduces how people’s perceptions of legal procedures’ integrity shape their view of legal proceedings. It then applies those insights to assess whether people will find their bankruptcy cases procedurally sound.91 After concluding that consumer bankruptcy’s current procedures lack the hallmarks of procedural justice, Section B turns to research about how people use
the legal system to confirm their social standing and to deal with their emotional reactions to problems. This allows for an assessment of whether the
faults in consumer bankruptcy’s procedural justice impact people’s motivation
to strengthen their financial positions after emerging from bankruptcy. This
Section concludes that bankruptcy’s procedures likely matter greatly to the
people who file. 92 Finally, Section C draws upon my interviews with people
who placed their small businesses in bankruptcy to provide some empirical
evidence that supports my conclusion that consumer bankruptcy presently is
procedurally bankrupt. 93
A. Assessing Consumer Bankruptcy’s Procedures
1. The Value of Legal Process
In the legal system, processes take on extra significance. Litigants often
are as or more concerned about a proceeding’s perceived fairness than its ultimate outcome. 94 That people care deeply about the process by which their cases and problems are handled, apart from the product of that process, may seem
90

See infra notes 94–224 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 94–119 and accompanying text.
92
See infra notes 120–206 and accompanying text.
93
See infra notes 207–224 and accompanying text.
94
See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts,
63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 132 (2011) (noting that research has “provided robust empirical evidence that
individuals care deeply about the fairness of the process by which decisions are made, apart from
considerations about the outcome of the decision”); supra note 3 and accompanying text.
91
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counterintuitive. But study after study has found that people place a high value
on procedural justice. 95
People’s perceptions of procedural justice influence how they think about
and whether they accept the outcomes of legal proceedings. If people view the
procedure that led to the outcome as fair, they are more likely to be satisfied
with the outcome and adhere to it going forward, even if the outcome is unfavorable to them. 96 Similarly, when people perceive legal procedures as just,
they also are more likely to view the institution that adjudicated the outcome as
legitimate. 97 This is not to say that people are indifferent to a proceeding’s outcome. Rather, believing that one received fair treatment influences that person’s willingness to accept the proceeding’s outcome independent of the effect
that the proceeding’s fairness had on the outcome. 98
Assessments of procedural justice hinge on several aspects of the process:
whether people (1) believe that they had a voice and chance to be heard, (2)
perceive that they were treated with dignity and respect, (3) feel that the decisionmaker sincerely considered their case, and (4) observe the forum as neutral
and even-handed. 99 The opportunity to be heard—that is, participation—is the

95
See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 94, at 132–34 (providing an overview of these studies);
Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 119 (2000) (discussing these studies).
96
See, e.g., LIND & TYLER, supra note 9, at 66–83 (discussing how people evaluate outcomes);
TYLER, supra note 3, at 94–112 (discussing how people’s experiences during legal proceedings influence their perceptions of outcomes’ legitimacy); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J.
DISP. RESOL. 1, 3–4 (overviewing social psychology research about the effects of people’s perceptions of procedural justice); Tyler, supra note 11, at 664–65 (“Studies show that people continue to
adhere to fair decisions over time . . . .”).
97
See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 3, at 161–63 (discussing “the procedural basis of legitimacy”);
Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 94, at 134 (noting research that “procedural justice is an important
component of individuals’ judgments about” legal systems’ legitimacy); Tyler, supra note 11, at 664–
70 (providing an overview of research that identifies “procedural justice and trust as the key antecedents of the willingness to defer to legal authorities”).
98
See Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 96, at 5 (“[P]rocedural justice has a separate and
independent effect on how people feel about their results, apart from how fair or how good the outcome is.”). Because research is interested in people’s perceptions of procedural justice, it necessarily
focuses on individuals’ subjective perceptions of fairness, rather than what system architects anticipated to be the processes’ effects. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 94, at 134 (noting this focus).
99
See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, in 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115, 138–43 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992) (providing
an overview of these four factors); Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 94, at 135 (noting that these four
factors are often cited); Tyler, supra note 11, at 665 (outlining four elements, “participation, neutrality, treatment with dignity and respect, and trust in authorities,” that “generally shape reactions to
courts”). See generally THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 9 (establishing the foundations of procedural
justice).
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most important factor in people’s assessments of procedural justice. 100 Believing that one has a voice affects evaluations of respect, trust in authorities, and
neutrality. 101 Feeling heard includes speaking for oneself or being present
while an attorney speaks on one’s behalf. 102 The opportunity for participation
is so crucial that the positive effects of feeling heard can accrue even when
people understand that their participation will have little effect on the ultimate
ruling. 103
People also are concerned with the trustworthiness of the authorities overseeing the adjudicatory process. 104 An authority’s legitimacy turns on whether
the authority is perceived to act in a fair manner, which again relates to a litigant’s opinion about the judicial process’s fairness. 105 Importantly, trust in authorities intersects with people’s perceptions about what a proceeding’s outcome conveys about their social standing. 106
Finally, the four factors people rely on to assess whether they received
procedural justice in their own dealings with the judicial system also are the

100
See, e.g., Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 94, at 135 (linking participation with control and
noting that “perceptions about control over process are an important determinant of whether people
feel that procedural justice has occurred”); Tyler, supra note 11, at 663 (noting the importance of
having a “day in court”); Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access
to Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 487–89 (2010) (reporting that
voice has the “strongest influence”).
101
See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & VALERIE P. HANS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TORT LAW 4
(2016) (noting the importance of “[t]he opportunity to recount one’s own story of an injury” in conjunction with procedural justice and the tort system); Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 96, at 5–
6 (linking trust with having a voice); Lind, supra note 3, at 179–81 (observing that people care about
voice because they want to know that the decisionmaker is fully informed, which influences the trust
in authorities necessary for people to accept the ultimate decision).
102
See Donna Shestowksy, The Psychology of Procedural Preference: How Litigants Evaluate
Legal Procedures Ex Ante, 99 IOWA L. REV. 637, 673–78 (2014) (discussing litigants’ preferences for
participation of attorneys); Roselle L. Wissler, Representation in Mediation: What We Know from
Empirical Research, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419, 447–50 (2010) (discussing relationships among
voice, participation, and acceptance of outcomes in mediations).
103
See Tyler, supra note 95, at 121 (noting that having a voice allows people to feel they are
participating). See generally E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952
(1990) (discussing the results of a research study into the role of participation in subjective feelings of
fairness). Nonetheless, if people believe they are being manipulated, they may respond with “extremely negative reactions.” Lind, supra note 3, at 187.
104
See Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Trust in Organizational Authorities: The Influence of Motive Attributions on Willingness to Accept Decisions, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF
THEORY AND RESEARCH 331, 333–34 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996) (discussing
how trust in authorities is “the strongest predictor of evaluations of the fairness of decision-making
procedures” and impacts people’s acceptance of decisions).
105
See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 94, at 137–38 (linking an authority’s legitimacy with the
process’s perceived fairness).
106
See id. (linking an authority’s legitimacy with litigants’ dignity and social standing).
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four key factors that the general public uses to assess courts as institutions.107
That is, the public stakes its faith in legal institutions’ decisions, in part, on
procedure: whether they believe that courts allow for participation, respectful
treatment, even-handed consideration, and neutrality. 108
2. Consumer Bankruptcy’s Procedural Justice
Procedural justice is important for two main reasons applicable to consumer bankruptcy. First, proceedings perceived as just lead to acceptance and
deference to the resulting judicial decisions. In consumer bankruptcy, the pertinent decisions are whether to grant discharge or whether to confirm a repayment plan that hopefully will lead to discharge. 109 Regardless of the outcome,
every debtor’s financial life continues past the bankruptcy case’s conclusion.
The extent to which debtors accept their cases’ outcomes may affect their motivation to make efficient use of the fresh start and to reenter the economy—
that is, to effectuate the policies underlying the consumer bankruptcy system. 110
Second, perceptions of the consumer bankruptcy process also may affect
how the public views the legitimacy of granting overindebted individuals the
opportunity to obtain a discharge. This likewise may impact the ability of the
consumer bankruptcy system to achieve its policy goals, and may affect
whether the overindebted households that will benefit from receiving a discharge of debts will be inclined to use the system.
Given what people generally know about the legal system—learned
through conversations with friends and family, television, books, and other
media—it can be posited that most people think that after a household files
bankruptcy, the debtors will sit before a judge and explain why they are asking
to be excused from paying their debts. Given society’s overall disapproval of
overindebtedness, people probably expect that debtors will be required to de107
See Tyler, supra note 11, at 665 (discussing the general public’s assessment of legal institutions on the basis of perceptions of procedural justice).
108
See Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and
Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215, 233–
34 (2001) (finding that public confidence and trust in state courts depends on people’s assessments of
the fairness of state courts’ procedures); supra note 99 and accompanying text (outlining these four
factors).
109
See supra notes 31–54 and accompanying text.
110
See Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 96, at 7 (discussing the perceptions of procedural
justice and noting that “[l]ess command and control is needed, and individuals can rely more on selfregulation in settings where authorities act in procedurally fair ways”); supra notes 20–28 and accompanying text. This observation aligns with the dignitary theory of procedural justice, which argues that
fair processes are most valuable because they enforce norms about dignity and acceptable interactions
among citizens. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 94, at 138–40 (discussing two primary theories of
procedural justice, the instrumental approach and the dignitary approach, and noting other theories).
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clare that they cannot pay back what they owe, that they are unable to live up
to their financial and social obligations, and that their predicament, simply put,
is hopeless. Again, given the vilification of overindebtedness, debtors likely
anticipate having the chance to impugn their creditors for not working with
them to make payments affordable, for not agreeing to refinance home loans,
or for simply extending them too much credit.
Most people—both consumer debtors and the general public—also probably think that creditors will be present during these hearings and will have the
right to cross-examine debtors, similar to what people see on television shows
involving the criminal justice system. 111 People consequently may believe that
creditors will hear debtors’ stories. Those households that file bankruptcy may
anticipate—perhaps fear—what their creditors may ask or say in response.
The actual bankruptcy process that consumer debtors encounter bears little resemblance to the procedure that people likely anticipate. Recall that chapter 7 and chapter 13 are distinct substantively. 112 But, the commonalities between the two proceedings are the most significant to people’s perceptions of
bankruptcy’s procedures.
Most debtors never appear in court before the bankruptcy judge and generally have little to no voice during their bankruptcy proceedings. Besides their
attorneys, the only judicial “officials” who debtors physically see are bankruptcy trustees. Debtors typically meet with trustees once, at the 341 meeting,
for ten minutes to half an hour, depending on the chapter and on the case’s
complexity. 113 At these meetings, most debtors are not confronted by their
creditors, though debtors may mention their creditors in their discussions with
trustees. 114 Thus, most debtors never have the opportunity to speak to bankruptcy judges or to their creditors directly nor to observe their attorneys doing
so on their behalf. 115
This presents a problem. The 341 meeting almost certainly does not provide an adequate substitute for what people anticipate they will experience or
what procedural justice research calls for in a legal proceeding’s process. Stated succinctly, the consumer bankruptcy system appears to be procedurally
bankrupt.

111
The Sixth Amendment grants people the right to confront their accusers in criminal proceedings. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The lay public may believe that this right is universal and be shocked to
find out it does not apply in civil and administrative proceedings.
112
See supra notes 31–54 and accompanying text.
113
See supra notes 39–43, 46 and accompanying text for a discussion of 341 hearings. The approximate timing comes from my observations of dozens of 341 hearings.
114
This is based upon my observations of dozens of 341 hearings.
115
Recall that people’s perceptions of procedural justice involve being present while attorneys
speak with judges or other officials. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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If debtors do not feel that they have a voice or that they can trust the authorities overseeing their cases—judges and trustees—then they may question
whether these authorities sincerely considered their financial problems. For
those debtors who do not receive a discharge or fail to complete their repayment plans, not having had the chance to speak with the judge and to be heard
by their creditors may negatively affect their ability to move forward postdismissal as they try to restructure their financial lives on their own. Even
debtors who receive discharges or confirmation of their repayment plans may
find bankruptcy’s procedures lacking and become disillusioned. Importantly,
all debtors may discuss their experiences during their cases with others, potentially disseminating information that persuades other households in need of the
discharge not to file bankruptcy. More broadly, this information may spread a
negative view of the consumer bankruptcy system and of the federal judiciary.
That people could become disheartened even if they receive a discharge
or plan confirmation also matters because the fresh start is simply that—a start.
After the discharge and during their repayment plans, people need to continue
to work to manage their finances and economic lives. This is not an easy
task. 116 Maintaining the fresh start is difficult, even for people who try their
hardest. 117 That only one-third of chapter 13 debtors complete their plans and
thus receive a discharge demonstrates how challenging it can be to stay afloat
financially after filing bankruptcy. 118
Even so, it may not be critical to consumer bankruptcy’s effectiveness for
debtors to feel that they had an opportunity to be heard by an authority who
they view as legitimate. What people expect from the procedures of other parts
of the justice system may not translate to consumer bankruptcy. People may
want a discharge of their debts and not much more. But if people expect more,
then consumer bankruptcy’s lack of procedural justice may damage the system’s effectiveness. In not receiving what they expect from the bankruptcy
process, research suggests that debtors will be less likely to accept their cases’
outcomes and to work to make the best use of the discharge.
Section B begins by providing an overview of research regarding how
people assert and affirm their social standing and deal with their emotions
through the legal system. It then applies this research to the people who file
116

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
See Sara S. Greene, Parina Patel, & Katherine Porter, Cracking the Code: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Bankruptcy Outcomes, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1032–33 (2017) (giving an overview of statistics about chapter 13 case dismissal); Porter & Thorne, supra note 21, at 70 (finding
from a survey of households that filed chapter 7 that within one year after discharge, one-quarter of
the households were struggling to pay routine bills and one-third of the households’ overall financial
situation had worsened since filing bankruptcy).
118
See Greene et al., supra note 117, at 1042–43 (calculating the average nationwide chapter 13
repayment plan completion rate).
117
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bankruptcy to assess how crucial consumer bankruptcy’s procedures are to the
system’s success. 119
B. Expression Through the Consumer Bankruptcy System
1. Social Standing
Legal rules express social norms and serve significant social purposes
apart from directly controlling people’s behavior. 120 The actions of judges,
government officials, and citizens acting through participation in the public
and private legal systems also express society’s view of the accused offender
and presumptive victim in the situations presented, similarly communicating
social norms. These observations are based on theories about the legal system’s
expressive functions. 121 This Article’s theory of consumer bankruptcy’s procedural justice is concerned with one strand of the legal system’s expressive
function—the significance of punishment or a finding of fault of an accused
offender to a victim’s social standing.
This understanding of the legal system’s expressive value is most clearly
refined in the context of criminal law. When a prosecutor takes action against
an accused, and the accused receives a sentence at the hands of a judge or jury,
the victim and members of society perceive that outcome as denunciation of
the offender’s actions. 122 Punishment expresses “disapproval and reprobation,
on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose
name’ the punishment is inflicted.” 123 It thus carries the “symbolic significance” of moral condemnation of the offender. 124
119

See infra notes 120–206 and accompanying text.
See Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Psychology, and Morality, 50 PSYCH. LEARNING
& MOTIVATION 101, 102 (2009) (“[T]he law prescribes and proscribes morally laden behaviors, but it
also unabashedly attempts to shape moral attitudes and beliefs.”); Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D.
Janis, Expressive Eligibility, 5 U. CAL. IRVINE L. REV. 973, 975–76 (2015) (applying this variety of
expressive theories of law to the patent system); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022–24 (1996) (“Many people support law because of the statements
made by law, and disagreements about law are frequently debates over the expressive content of
law.”).
121
For a more complete overview, see Adler, supra note 6, at 1414–27 (describing the expressive
theories of punishment).
122
See JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95–
118 (1970) (discussing moral condemnation through legal punishment); Jean Hampton, An Expressive
Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 20–22 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) [hereinafter Hampton, An Expressive Theory] (discussing how the message sent by criminal punishment is
about the “moral relationship among human beings”); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597–98 (1996) (discussing the expressive theory of criminal punishment).
123
FEINBERG, supra note 122, at 98.
124
Id.; see Kahan, supra note 122, at 593 (“Punishment is not just a way to make offenders suffer; it is a special social convention that signifies moral condemnation.”).
120
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Criminal punishment’s symbolic significance links directly to a victim’s
social standing. A person’s view of her social standing, including where she
stands in relation to others in her social group and to society at large, is integral
to fulfilling her “need to belong.” 125 Assessment of social standing encompasses two social group dimensions: “within groups” and “between groups.”126
People view themselves as belonging to a particular social group, their “ingroup,” and compare their “ingroup” to other social “outgroups” to assess how
their group stands “between groups” in society. 127
A person’s ingroup itself carries a positive or negative connotation, determined by comparing its prestige to the prestige of relevant outgroups: positive discrepancies result in high prestige and negative discrepancies result in
low prestige. 128 Because people generally value a “positive social identity,”129
they will strive to enhance their group’s position, or, at the very least, maintain
their group’s social identity. 130 A necessary corollary of this observation is that
when their social identity is threatened, people will seek to assert and confirm
their social status and their group’s relative position in society. 131

125
Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of Delegated Revenge, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1059, 1086 (2007); see
Tom R. Tyler & Heather J. Smith, Justice, Social Identity, and Group Processes, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SELF 223, 223 (Tom R. Tyler et al. eds., 1999) (“[G]roups both define who people
are and tell them how to evaluate what they are worth.”); Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The
Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117
PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 497 (1995) (discussing affiliating with other people); Richard H. McAdams,
The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355–56 (1997) (“[P]eople
seek esteem: the good opinion or respect of others.”).
126
See Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, in
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7, 15–16 (Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds.,
1986) (providing an overview of social identity and social comparison); Bilz & Nadler, supra note
120, at 122–23 (discussing the aspects of social standing).
127
See Tajfel & Turner, supra note 126, at 15 (conceptualizing a group “as a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional
involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus
about the evaluation of their group and of their membership in it”).
128
See id. at 16–17 (“The evaluation of one’s own group is determined with reference to specific
other groups through social comparisons in terms of value-laden attributes and characteristics.”); John C.
Turner & Rina S. Onorato, Social Identity, Personality, and the Self-Concept: A Self-Categorization
Perspective, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SELF, supra note 125, at 11, 18 (discussing comparisons of ingroup and relevant outgroups).
129
Bilz, supra note 125; see Tajfel & Turner, supra note 126, at 16–17 (discussing how positive
and negative discrepancies may lead to competitive acts among social groups).
130
See Wenzel et al., supra note 4, at 383 (“Status and power are inherently relative or competitive.”).
131
See id. (discussing how “victims distinguish psychologically between themselves and the
offender”).
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In the context of crime, as argued by Jean Hampton, an offender’s actions
may degrade and demean the victim, imperiling the victim’s social standing.132
Even if the offender’s actions do not inflict harm or suffering on the victim, the
victim may lose status within her ingroup because “inherent in a criminal’s
action is the message that the victim is not worth enough for him to treat her
better.” 133 Others may share the victim’s sense of social standing loss. 134 Consequently, the victim will be motivated to reclaim her social standing. 135
Besides potentially morally condemning the accused, prosecution provides “a referendum on the social standing and worth of the victim,” allowing
the victim to objectively assess her social standing through the eyes of others. 136 If a judge or jury of the victim’s peers punishes the accused, the victim
may conclude that society believes that the message of the offender’s action
about her value and social worth were incorrect, restoring her social standing.
But if a judge or jury does not punish the accused, the victim may conclude
that her community disdains her, that the accused’s actions were appropriate,
and that she belongs to a less prestigious ingroup. 137
The same holds true for third-party observers of criminal proceedings.
Research shows that when an accused is punished, community members’ perceptions of the victim’s worth improve, but that when the accused escapes punishment, community members respect and value the victim less. 138

132
See Hampton, An Expressive Theory, supra note 122, at 6 (distinguishing degradation from
feeling demeaned); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1666 (1992) (noting that some actions are “an affront to the victim’s
value or dignity”).
133
Hampton, An Expressive Theory, supra note 122, at 12.
134
See Kenworthey Bilz & John M. Darley, What’s Wrong with Harmless Theories of Punishment, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1215, 1233–37 (2004) (discussing how robbery victims report that feelings of being violated are more detrimental to them than the actual material loss and describing the
effects of victimization on third parties).
135
See Bilz, supra note 125, at 1086–87 (“[People] aspire to be well-regarded members of the
groups to which they do belong, and they value their group having high standing compared to other
groups.”).
136
See id. at 1088–89 (“Social status is, by definition, social.”).
137
See id. at 1088 (discussing punishment as it relates to social standing); Kahan, supra note 122,
at 598 (providing similar discussion).
138
See Carloyn L. Hafer, Why We Reject Innocent Victims, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN EVERYDAY LIFE 109, 109, 113–14 (Michael Ross & Dale T. Miller eds., 2011) (finding that if an accused is
not punished, third parties tend to disassociate themselves from the victim); Kenworthey Bilz, Testing
the Expressive Theory of Punishment, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 358, 361–62, 385–86 (2016)
[hereinafter Bilz, Testing] (discussing this empirical evidence and demonstrating that, in the eyes of
others, criminal punishment of an accused increases the victim’s social standing, while failure to punish decreases the victim’s social standing); Uli Orth, Secondary Victimization of Crime Victims by
Criminal Proceedings, 15 SOC. JUST. RES. 313, 313–14 (2002) (finding that victims who believe that
the criminal justice system failed them feel rejected by their community and society).
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Similarly, when a private citizen seeks to hold an accused offender accountable through a legal proceeding, and a judge or jury does so, this sends a
message about what society thinks of the offender’s actions, the offender, and
the victim. Tort verdicts or even a sincere apology from a perpetrator to the
victim conveys information about the wrongfulness of the accused’s behavior,
thereby communicating to the victim that she is a valued member of society.139
As with the theory of the expressive function of criminal law, empirical research shows that plaintiffs’ goals in civil litigation transcend monetary concerns and include aims that are expressive and communicative, such as
acknowledgement of harm and admissions of fault. 140
2. Emotions
Part of seeking confirmation of social standing is dealing with the emotions that arise from the actions and circumstances that bring people to the judicial system. Indeed, research increasingly explores emotions’ connection
with the legal system. 141 Emotions are described as “engagements with the
world.” 142 People’s emotions both affect how they act and manifest as cognitive and physiological states. 143
139
See ROBBENNOLT & HANS, supra note 101, at 19 (noting that public judgment can “communicate to an injured party that he is a respected member of the community” and that an apology can
provide accountability from the accused); Alan Strudler, Mass Torts and Moral Principles, 11 LAW &
PHIL. 297, 316–17 (1992) (“[T]he tort system, when it works well, constitutes a conventional device
by which an injurer may be compelled to express regret to his victim.”); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071,
2086 (1998) (connecting punitive damages “with their historical origins in affronts to the honor of the
victims”).
140
See, e.g., AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS 93
(1995) (finding that litigants turn to the judicial system for validation that they have received unjust
treatment); Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’
Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 706–07 (2007) (recounting findings from interviews with
parties and attorneys involved in sixty-four medical malpractice cases); Wenzel et al., supra note 4, at
377 (“Victims seem to place less importance on material restoration than ‘emotional restoration.’”).
141
For foundational works in this field, see generally SUSAN A. BANDES, THE PASSIONS OF LAW
(1999) (discussing the role emotions play within the justice system); Susan A. Bandes & Jeremy A.
Blumenthal, Emotion and the Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 161 (2012) (discussing the field of
law and emotion); Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CAL. L. REV.
1485 (2011) (proposing a model for management of judicial emotions); Terry A. Maroney, Law and
Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119 (2006) (proposing six interrelated subfields within law and emotion).
142
Robert C. Solomon, Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings: Emotions as Engagements with the
World, in THINKING ABOUT FEELING: CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS ON EMOTIONS 76, 76 (Robert
C. Solomon ed., 2004). See generally Dacher Keltner & Jennifer S. Lerner, Emotion, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 317 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 2010) (discussing how emotions are
social).
143
See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 297 (1996) (“Emotions motivate behavior.”); Emily Kidd White, Till Human
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“Psychologists generally identify eight basic emotions: anger, anticipation, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise, and trust.” 144 Other literature identifies several other major emotions, including guilt and shame. Of these emotions, anger, guilt, shame, and disgust stand out as relevant to consumer debtors’ decisions to use the bankruptcy system. 145 This Article focuses on these
emotions in part based on my prior study of consumers’ complaints about financial product and service providers filed through the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB)’s complaint mechanism. 146 With consumers’ permission, the CFPB publishes the narratives that consumers write in connection
with their complaints. 147 The emotions that people use to describe their debt
problems during a time when they could file bankruptcy are particularly relevant to understanding the feelings that people may bring with them into the
bankruptcy system. Of note, these narratives strongly display consumers’ anger
and frustration. 148
Anger is the emotion most often associated with criminal and civil justice.
It arises when a person feels insulted or hurt in a significant way. 149 Feeling
angry hinges on presuppositions about proper behavior and what constitutes
respect—that is, social norms. 150 If people are not treated according to expected norms, they will question their social status. 151 Anger presses people to

Voices Wake Us: The Role of Emotions in the Adjudication of Dignity Claims, 3 J.L. RELIGION & ST.
201, 204 (2014) (discussing the affective and cognitive states of emotions).
144
See Pamela Foohey, Calling on the CFPB for Help: Telling Stories and Consumer Protection,
80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 189 (2017) [hereinafter Foohey, Calling on] (discussing basic and
major emotions).
145
See id.; Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 143, at 276 (listing major emotions).
146
See generally Foohey, Calling on, supra note 144 (discussing how understanding emotions
can improve the CFPB).
147
See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER COMPLAINT DATABASE, https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/ [https://perma.cc/P4EB-4TWD] (publishing the narratives of certain consumers).
148
Foohey, Calling on, supra note 144, at 195. I also focused on sadness and fear when analyzing
the narratives. Id. at 189–91.
149
See RICHARD S. LAZARUS, EMOTION AND ADAPTATION 217–34 (1991) (discussing anger);
Richard S. Lazarus, Progress on a Cognitive-Motivational-Relational Theory of Emotion, 46 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 819, 828 (1991) (noting that insult is the primary instigator of anger); Dale T. Miller,
Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 527, 533 (2001) (discussing
research showing that disrespect leads to anger and aggression).
150
People expect to be treated with more respect by ingroup members than outgroup members,
and being treated with disrespect by ingroup versus outgroup members provokes different responses.
Miller, supra note 149, at 539 (noting that outgroup offenses provoke a “How dare they?” response
and ingroup offenses provoke a “How could they?” response).
151
See id. at 533 (linking disrespect and “social imbalance”).
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defend their status and reinforce what they believe is appropriate behavior, restoring their self-esteem and achieving closure. 152
For example, in the context of crime, an injustice perpetrated against a
victim triggers anger. Drawing from this anger, the victim retaliates to restore
self-esteem and educate the offender about proper social relations. 153 Punishment of the offender provides for the censure that corrects “the moral-symbolic
meaning of the offense.” 154
Guilt and shame, two distinct but related “self-conscious” emotions, also
are intertwined with people’s sense of self and social standing. 155 Selfconscious emotions require individuals to have a “sense of self as well as a set
of standards” by which they assess their own behavior as successful or
failed. 156 A person feels guilt when she evaluates her action or behavior as failing and focuses on what about her specific behavior transgressed an important
social norm. 157 With shame, a person negatively evaluates herself as a whole as
failing. 158 Guilt thus focuses on the action, whereas shame focuses on the person. 159 Although the same situation can elicit guilt and shame, shame is a more
social emotion, is regulated through community standards, and is linked with a
person’s social image and feelings of social devaluation. 160

152
See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 143, at 347–48 (discussing anger, social norms, and status); Miller, supra note 149, at 534, 540–41 (linking anger with self-esteem and perceptions of injustice); Arne Roets & Alain Van Hiel, An Integrative Process Approach of Judgment and Decision
Making: The Impact of Arousal, Affect, Motivation, and Cognitive Ability, 61 PSYCHOL. REC. 497,
499–500 (2011) (discussing closure as a motivator in decision making).
153
See Miller, supra note 149, at 540–42 (discussing the goals of retaliation); Wenzel et al., supra
note 4, at 380 (“[V]ictims seek revenge to restore their honor and their self-image.”).
154
Wenzel et al., supra note 4, at 379.
155
Michael Lewis, Self-Conscious Emotions, 83 AM. SCIENTIST 68, 68 (1995).
156
Id.; see Jessica L. Tracy & Richard W. Robins, Putting the Self into Self-Conscious Emotions:
A Theoretical Model, 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 103, 105 (2004) (noting that people experience selfconscious emotions when they are aware they have succeeded or failed to live up to an ideal).
157
See Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna, Differentiating Shame from Guilt, 27 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 725, 727 (2008) (“[G]uilt is tied to some specific behavior.”).
158
See id. (defining shame).
159
See Foohey, Calling on, supra note 144, at 191 (differentiating shame and guilt); Raffaele
Rodogno, Shame, Guilt, and Punishment, 28 LAW & PHIL. 429, 432–33 (2009) (discussing the difference).
160
See LAZARUS, supra note 149, at 240–47 (distinguishing guilt and shame); Paul Gilbert, Evolution, Social Roles, and the Differences in Shame and Guilt, 70 SOC. RES. 1205, 1208 (2003)
(“Shame relates to the competitive dynamics of life, linked to social standing and personal reputations.”); Margaret E. Kemeny et al., Shame as the Emotional Response to Threat to the Social Self:
Implications for Behavior, Physiology, and Health, 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 153, 154 (2004) (discussing studies regarding the link between shame and social status); Teroni & Deonna, supra note 157, at
729 (linking shame and community standards).
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The behavioral consequences of guilt and shame also differ. Guilt drives
people to try to repair the wrongs associated with it. 161 Shame encourages people to hide so as to preserve their social standing. 162 Nonetheless, people may
act in the face of shame with “reparative and conciliatory behavior” to avoid
an unwanted lower social status or to escape stigmatization. 163 Stigma can
strongly influence feelings of shame, particularly depending on which cultural
values are marked as worthy of stigmatizing others for their nonconformity. 164
The shame associated with stigmatization may provoke anger, which may
prompt people to act to eliminate present and future feelings of shame. 165
Finally, disgust intersects with anger, guilt, and shame. Disgust arises
when people confront something revolting, 166 and creates a desire to change or
withdraw from a situation or person. 167 Like guilt and shame, disgust is a
“moral” emotion. 168 People may find others (or themselves) disgusting if they
violate a social or moral code. 169 Disgust can be felt as a self-condemning
emotion whereby people want to purge themselves of what they find reviling
to “reestablish dignity.” 170
Disgust also links with shame’s response to others’ disapproval, a disapproval possibly grounded in disgust for what they have done, such as not pay

161
See Gilbert, supra note 160, at 1205–06 (describing guilt as “evolv[ing] from a care-giving
and ‘avoiding doing harm to others’ system”); Tracy & Robins, supra note 156, at 103 (discussing
research regarding the behavioral outcomes of guilt and shame).
162
See LAZARUS, supra note 149, at 243–44 (distinguishing the “action tendencies” of guilt and
shame and noting that “shame makes us want to hide”).
163
See Teroni & Deonna, supra note 157, at 735 (discussing the differences between shame and
guilt). See generally Debra Patterson & Rebecca Campbell, Why Rape Survivors Participate in the
Criminal Justice System, 28 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 191 (2010) (discussing what makes some rape
survivors withdraw from criminal investigations versus what makes other survivors continue to participate after reporting their assaults).
164
See Gilbert, supra note 160, at 1215–19 (discussing how shame and stigma are linked with
cultural values). See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
SPOILED IDENTITY (1963) (linking stigma, social identity, personal identity, and group alignment).
165
See Gilbert, supra note 160, at 1225 (“Shaming people can lead to various unhelpful defensive
emotions.”); James Gilligan, Shame, Guilt, and Violence, 70 SOC. RES. 1149, 1149–52, 1159–60
(2003) (noting that researchers often provoke anger in experiments by insulting—that is, shaming,
people).
166
See LAZARUS, supra note 149, at 259–62 (discussing disgust).
167
See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 1–2 (1997) (overviewing disgust);
Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Emotion and Decision Making, 66 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 799, 808–09 (2015)
(noting that disgust shapes decision making through goal activation).
168
See Jonathan Haidt, The Moral Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 852, 853
(R.J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003) (“Moral emotions are the emotions that respond to moral violations
or that motivate moral behavior.”); MILLER, supra note 167, at 1–2 (discussing how disgust “is a
moral and social sentiment”).
169
Haidt, supra note 168, at 855–61 (categorizing emotions).
170
Id. at 857–58; see MILLER, supra note 167, at 34–35 (associating disgust with self-loathing).
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their debts, which itself creates social inequality. 171 People often react to their
perceived social inequality by trying to distance themselves from the traits
within themselves that caused their disgust. 172
Overall, across anger, guilt, shame, and disgust, one of people’s main responses is to try to distance themselves from the emotion. Distancing themselves from these feelings should increase people’s perceptions of their relative
social standing. As such, as with other legal proceedings, overindebted individuals may look to the bankruptcy process to help them deal with these emotions and assert their social standing.
3. Debts’ Diminished Social Standing and Heightened Emotions
For the one million people who file bankruptcy every year, 173 their financial situations undoubtedly prompt them to consider using bankruptcy to gain a
fresh start. Aside from how bankruptcy discharge’s benefits accrue to the fullest extent possible, bankruptcy’s procedures should align with how people actually use the system. People’s mindset when they file bankruptcy shapes what
they seek from their cases, including as expressive and emotional matters. Understanding this mindset is central to evaluating the effects of consumer bankruptcy’s seeming lack of procedural justice.
Research about who files bankruptcy provides clues as to people’s outlook on their situations as they enter the bankruptcy system. 174 Most significantly, consumer debtors report struggling for years to pay their debts prior to
filing. 175 Despite having tried to pay their debts by forgoing necessities and
employing a wide range of coping mechanisms, they have landed in a state of
stressful overindebtedness marred by calls from creditors and debt collectors. 176
People facing ostensibly insurmountable debts may find themselves disgusted by their financial situations. They may feel guilty and ashamed about
their social offense of being unable to pay their debts. People also may be angry at the creditors who seemingly allowed them to get into such dire financial
171
See MILLER, supra note 167, at 34–35 (noting that “[d]isgust works first and if it fails shame
will be the consequence” and linking “sociomoral” disgust and social inequality); June Price Tangney
et al., Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 345, 353 (2007) (linking shame
and feeling disgust “for a bad, defective self”).
172
See MILLER, supra note 167, at 34 (“In disgust we wish to have the offensive thing disappear
by the removal of either ourselves or it; in shame we simply want to disappear.”); Lerner et al., supra
note 167, at 809 (noting that studies show that disgust makes people more likely to choose to switch to
something unknown rather than keep something disgusting).
173
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
174
See generally supra notes 56–89 and accompanying text.
175
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
176
See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
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situations, and then dunned them with calls to collect debts that they increasingly had little hope of being able to pay.
Because of debtors’ financial situations, during the months leading up to
their bankruptcy filings, most unsecured creditors cannot collect on delinquent
debts unless the debtors agree to pay or the creditors go to court to receive
judgments that allow them to attach debtors’ property, such as orders to garnish
debtors’ bank accounts or wages. 177 Data from the CBP show that creditors file
such actions to collect on debts, secured and unsecured. 178 These actions likewise may incite anger, particularly if people are unable to pay their expenses
because of the garnishment. 179
Debt collection, both in and out of court, may also add to people’s guilt.
Every call is an instance in which debtors are unable to live up to their obligations. Regardless of how boorishly debt collectors treat them, people generally
want to pay. 180 As one debt collector observed:
It is a big misconception that people don’t want to pay. When the
debtors do the screaming, and the ducking out, and the complaining,
it’s just them lashing out because they can’t pay . . . . If you called
people up and they had ten grand in the bank, they would pay instantly. 181
Being unable to pay is an act of failure, an act that transgresses the important social norm of paying back one’s debts. Debtors’ lashing out and complaining, as noted by this debt collector, likely arises from people’s guilt and
disgust when faced with the inability to pay debts. Similarly, garnishment orders are statements issued by judicial authorities that households are unable to
177
See Richard M. Hynes, Bankruptcy and State Collections: The Case of the Missing Garnishments, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 622–24 (2006) (overviewing garnishment and describing a garnishment order as “forcing the third party to pay a portion of these assets to the creditor instead of the
debtor”); Mann & Porter, supra note 49, at 309–10 (discussing garnishment).
178
See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
179
See John Infranca, Safer Than the Mattress? Protecting Social Security Benefits from Bank
Freezes and Garnishments, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1127, 1127 (2009) (noting that a “brief interruption” in access to social security benefits via garnishment can make “it difficult, if not impossible, for
a beneficiary to purchase food, pay rent, and provide for basic medical needs”).
180
See Sousa, supra note 61, at 464–68 (quoting from interviews with consumer debtors about
wanting to pay back their debts); Deborah Thorne & Leon Anderson, Managing the Stigma of Personal Bankruptcy, 39 SOC. FOCUS 77, 83 (2006) (discussing how people attempt to pay back their
debts); Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 971–72 (2010) (noting that people continue to pay their mortgages “even when they are hundreds of thousands of dollars underwater and have
no reasonable prospect of recouping their losses”).
181
See JAKE HALPERN, BAD PAPER: CHASING DEBT FROM WALL STREET TO THE UNDERWORLD
95–96 (2014) (quoting a debt collector and further noting that most collectors heeded this observation
and strove to empathize and thereby “marry the debtor”).
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live up to their obligations. People may view these orders as public affirmations of their failure, creating feelings of guilt, shame, and anger.
People also may become disillusioned with their creditors and the consumer credit industry more generally. The 2008 financial crisis brought calls
for reforms aimed at curbing deceitful behavior by banks and other financial
institutions. 182 Popular narratives about who is to blame for individuals’ financial failures also shifted. Rather than attribute overindebtedness solely to consumers’ actions and character flaws, financial institutions increasingly bore
negative labels, such as peddlers of “financial weapons of mass destruction,”
as characterized by Warren Buffet. 183
Such feelings about the economic system’s role in overindebtedness are
not unique to the 2008 financial crisis. History has often pitted households that
spend for personal and family purposes against their creditors. 184 These conflicts are described as part of “class formation, with an indebted lower class
and a more powerful creditor higher class.” 185 Perceptions about this lowerclass status may influence how people think about using the legal system’s
substantive law or the system’s procedures. 186
Research further shows that indebtedness, particularly debts so large that
they impact how people live their everyday lives, brings a perceived lowerclass status. That is, people experience overindebtedness as a distinct “lower”
and stigmatized social class. 187 Importantly, overindebtedness plunges some
individuals and families into this lower social class. Although overindebted-

182
See Charles Eisenstein, “Don’t Owe. Won’t Pay.” Everything You’ve Been Told About Debt Is
Wrong, YES! MAG. (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/the-debt-issue/don-t-owewon-t-pay-charles-eisenstein-debt-20150820 [https://perma.cc/YD7F-7GUC] (discussing the crisis).
183
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2003); see CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 3–8 (2016) (referring to many financial products as “weapons of math
destruction” that can reinforce existing inequalities).
184
See Teresa A. Sullivan, Debt and the Simulation of Social Class, in A DEBTOR WORLD: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON DEBT, supra note 24, at 36, 48 (noting the “long history” of
debtor/creditor conflicts); Jean Braucher, Theories of Overindebtedness: Interaction of Structure and
Culture, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 323, 339 (2006) (noting that “the 1960s marked a huge shift in
attitudes toward debt problems” that resulted in higher tolerance for taking on debts and for people
who encountered problems with their debts).
185
Sullivan, supra note 184, at 48.
186
See William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 401
(1994) (noting that bankruptcy may serve as a “vehicle for delivering the elusive goal of consumer
justice” when other consumer protection laws fall short).
187
See Stephen E.G. Lea et al., The Psychology of Debt in Poor Households in Britain, in A
DEBTOR WORLD: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON DEBT, supra note 24, at 151, 152 (discussing data); Sullivan, supra note 184, at 48 (highlighting the “loss of social status, sometimes in severe
ways” that is historically associated with debt).
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ness transcends socio-economic class, 188 people who for much of their lives
identified as middle-class make up the vast majority of the consumers who
ultimately file bankruptcy. 189
To appreciate the perceived severity of this loss of social status, consider
the predominant factors that lead the people who file bankruptcy to become
overindebted: job loss, divorce, and health problems. 190 In all likelihood, most
people do not consider any of these causes of their overindebtedness to be
within their control. No one wants to get sick. 191 Despite nationwide divorce
rates, (presumably almost) no one enters into a marriage planning to divorce. 192 And although people’s behavior and skills can lead to job loss, shifts
in the economy and declining average duration of employment with a particular employer have become the chief drivers of job loss. 193
Overindebtedness further hampers these individuals’ ability to lift themselves back into the “higher” middle socio-economic class to which they formerly belonged. 194 Given this, those who eventually file bankruptcy may feel
trapped in the stigmatized and shameful state of overindebtedness. Although
this stigma and shame may make some people withdraw from society as they

188
See Lupica, supra note 22, at 587 (“The tension between the desire and resistance to consume
is felt by consumers at all levels of the class spectrum.”).
189
See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
190
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
191
This statement excludes people suffering from Münchausen syndrome, which itself is a disease. See Richard Gunderman, When People Seem to Want to Be Sick, THE ATLANTIC (June 11,
2003), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/06/when-people-seem-to-want-to-be-sick/
276745/ [https://perma.cc/878K-QECT] (describing Münchausen syndrome).
192
For instance, the divorce rate for first marriages in America is between 41% and 49%. See
ROSE M. KREIDER & RENEE ELLIS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF
MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 2009, at 14 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p70-125.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8FXE-9XLU] (discussing divorce statistics from first marriages based on the couple’s race).
193
See Jacob S. Hacker, The Middle Class at Risk, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 39, at 218, 223–25 (noting that changes in employment began prior to the
recession and discussing the growth of “income instability” among American households); Braucher,
supra note 184, at 332 (noting that fewer unions and more competitive labor markets have increased
job insecurity).
194
See Lupica, supra note 22, at 563 (“[O]verindebtedness . . . thwarts class mobility.”); Katherine Porter, The Damage of Debt, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 979, 1006 (2012) [hereinafter Porter, The
Damage] (“Other important endowments that may be altered as a result of overindebtedness are education, job training, and health.”); Anuj K. Shah et al., Some Consequences of Having Too Little, 338
SCI. 682, 684–85 (2012) (discussing how not having enough money to pay for basic expenses can lead
people to borrow even more). If these individuals slip out of the mainstream banking, they may encounter even more difficulties in regaining their middle-class status simply because they now pay
more for most financial services. See MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS 9–10
(2015) (noting how lack of access to financial services “makes it even more difficult for [the poor] to
escape poverty”).
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deal with a loss of self-esteem, 195 overindebtedness caused by events and circumstances beyond one’s control may not necessarily prompt feelings of
shame to the point of lowering one’s self-esteem.
Research shows that when people blame themselves for the negative outcomes in their lives, they are likely to experience low self-esteem, but when
they attribute their failures to others and outside forces, such as prejudice, they
can protect their self-esteem. 196 Given this, people who turn to bankruptcy may
react to their financial situations in a way that encourages them to take stock of
what is happening around them. 197 In considering their circumstances, they
also may tend toward disgust, including reviling at their overindebtedness, and
experiencing it as something from which they want to distance themselves.
When combined with their stewing anger at creditors, instead of retreating into their shame, some middle-class debtors may lash out toward their
creditors, resolving to refute “illegitimate” debts. 198 Indeed, the belief that
some debts are less legitimate than others dovetails with perceptions that debt
is ubiquitous to the point of being systemic and inescapable. People thus may
view their own crushing debts as even more out of their control, again pushing
them toward feelings of anger and disgust. People will likely direct this disgust
toward their creditors and the economic system. This disgust thus should further urge people to distance themselves from their creditors.
In sum, consumer debtors do not simply enter bankruptcy for the discharge; rather, their pre-bankruptcy experiences set them up to be paradigms
for the expressive value theory of people’s use of the legal system. The people
who file bankruptcy are positioned to want the legal process to assist them in
“clearing the air” about their financial lives in addition to clearing their debts.

195
See, e.g., Jennifer Crocker & Hart Blanton, Social Inequality and Self-Esteem: The Moderating Effects of Social Comparison, Legitimacy, and Contingencies of Self-Esteem, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SELF, supra note 125, at 171, 172–73 (linking stigma and self-esteem); Hugh F.
“Trey” Daly III et al., Into the Red to Stay in the Pink: The Hidden Cost of Being Uninsured, 12
HEALTH MATRIX 39, 43 (2002) (discussing medical debt and quoting one interviewee, “I am ashamed
to take my kids to the physician because I think they know I owe thirty-five dollars”); Terrell A.
Hayes, Stigmatizing Indebtedness: Implications for Labeling Theory, 23 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 29,
29, 33 (2000) (interviewing participants in Debtors’ Anonymous and discussing labeling, stigma, and
shame connected with overindebtedness); Porter, The Damage, supra note 194, at 1011–12 (positing a
link between debt burdens and self-esteem).
196
See Crocker & Blanton, supra note 195, at 177–79 (synthesizing research about attributions of
disadvantage). See generally KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, NO SHAME IN MY GAME: THE WORKING
POOR IN THE INNER CITY (1999) (interviewing the “working poor” in New York).
197
See Mann & Porter, supra note 49, at 313 (discussing the “ostrich defense” employed by some
people who blame outside forces before they turn to the bankruptcy system).
198
See Eisenstein, supra note 182 (discussing the concept of “illegitimate” debts).
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4. What People Want from Consumer Bankruptcy’s Procedures
With this background, now consider what social and emotional benefits
people may anticipate from the bankruptcy process. Debtors should be particularly interested in what bankruptcy’s procedures may allow them to convey to
their communities and what the procedures’ outcomes communicate about
their social standing. Through the bankruptcy process, they may desire to assert and assess their social status, confirm their “ingroup,” and reinforce their
position in society, including through their discussions with the bankruptcy
judge and their creditors. 199
To assert what they believe is their true social standing, debtors may want
to tell their stories and explain the origin and progression of their financial situations. 200 Doing so will allow them to distance themselves from the disgust
they feel, to vent anger, and to work through lingering shame from the stigma
of overindebtedness. 201 Publicly telling their stories also may allow people to
feel that they are taking control of their financial futures. 202
Consumer debtors’ bankruptcy case outcomes likewise should be important to them because of what the outcomes communicate about social standing. To put bankruptcy’s outcomes in the context of the criminal and civil justice systems, to a debtor, the discharge or plan confirmation order is akin to
punishment of the accused criminal or a verdict for the plaintiff in a civil action. 203 The order acknowledges that the debtor merits forgiveness and relief
from the stress and stigma of crushing debts. 204 It also represents an opportunity to reenter the economy and to have enough funds and mental energy to participate in social life, as debtors did before encountering the unanticipated
events that led to unmanageable debts. Further, those debtors who are frustrat199

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
201
See Foohey, Calling on, supra note 144, at 205–06 (noting that “storytelling can help people
deal with stress, loss, and pain, and make sense of what has happened”).
202
That people who have filed bankruptcy report that they are very careful with credit postdischarge may lend support for this observation. See Katherine Porter, Life After Debt: Understanding
the Credit Restraint of Bankruptcy Debtors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (reporting that
the pattern of debtors’ post-bankruptcy credit usage reflects self-restraint).
203
Bankruptcy cases’ procedural posture places debtors in the position of bringing the legal action that effectively flips the role of plaintiff and defendant as understood in most civil legal proceedings. This account, of course, contrasts with the traditional conception of debtors as “offenders” whom
society forces creditors to forgive. See Emily Kadens, The Last Bankrupt Hanged: Balancing Incentives in the Development of Bankruptcy Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1231–33, 1240–42 (2010) (detailing
the history of allowing people to discharge their debts that began with criminal prosecutions, prisons,
and hangings).
204
This may be thought of as the other side of the moral imperative to grant individuals relief
from crushing debt that some have posited as a normative reason for allowing discharge. See supra
note 24 and accompanying text.
200
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ed with creditors’ and debt collectors’ actions or the credit industry in general
may see the discharge or plan confirmation order as a condemnation of those
actions.
Stated in the terms of research about social status and groups, 205 a consumer debtor may consider the bankruptcy court’s order a public statement that
she does not belong in the “lower” social group marred by debt. Instead, her
correct “ingroup” is the more prestigious middle class to which she previously
belonged. Likewise, as with criminal and civil proceedings, if the bankruptcy
judge denies the debtor a discharge or if the debtor fails to complete the chapter 13 plan, the debtor may decide that her true place within society is in the
less prestigious social class of the chronically indebted. 206
In short, separate from any financial benefits, people likely anticipate that
the bankruptcy process and its outcome will serve as a referendum on their
social standing. Thus, there is good reason to think that whether people who
use the bankruptcy system will heed and gain the most benefit from their repayment plans and discharges depends in part on their ability to have a voice
during their cases. Stated differently, the lessons of research about procedural
justice and the legal system’s expressive value should apply just as forcefully
to consumer bankruptcy as to other parts of the justice system.
C. What We Know About Bankruptcy’s Procedural Justice
There exists almost no empirical research directly into the social and
emotional impetuses that inform this Article’s theory of the importance of
bankruptcy’s procedural justice. Most of the relevant research comes from the
CBP. Because the CBP focuses on who files bankruptcy and why people file at
a more macro level, its data are useful for developing the theory, but not for
confirming the theory’s validity.
Nonetheless, there is some relevant research from business bankruptcy,
the results of which support this Article’s theory. As part of my project studying the chapter 11 cases filed by religious nonprofits—mainly Christian
churches—I interviewed forty-five leaders who put their churches and reli-

205

See supra notes 120–140 and accompanying text.
Some people file bankruptcy multiple times. See Sara Sternberg Greene, The Failed Reform:
Congressional Crackdown on Repeat Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filers, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 241, 245–
47 (2015) (providing data regarding repeat filers). Some of these debtors may file repeatedly as a
strategic matter. Some may file twice because of an issue with their first case, such as a missed deadline. Id. at 252–57. And some debtors may file more than once because they do not agree with the
outcome of their prior case or cases—that is, they file again to reassert their social standing one more
time.
206

2019]

Procedural Justice in Consumer Bankruptcy

2333

gious schools into chapter 11 proceedings between 2006 and 2013. 207 During
these interviews, in part to assess what they expected from the bankruptcy process, I asked the leaders if anything about their bankruptcy cases surprised or
stood out to them. 208
Pastors and other interviewees are business leaders, not consumer debtors. Even so, these interviewees’ reactions to their organizations’ bankruptcy
cases offer a useful vantage point to assess this Article’s theory because religious non-profits’ bankruptcy filings show similarities to consumer bankruptcy
filings. Most notably, the timing of the filings tracks that of individuals, not
businesses. 209 My interviews also revealed that pastors and other leaders think
about the decisions to place their organizations in bankruptcy in ways very
similar to how consumer debtors decide to file bankruptcy. 210
When asked if anything about the bankruptcy case surprised or stood out
to them, leaders spoke most often of their determination to use bankruptcy to
get back on solid financial ground in the face of creditors’ relentless and unfair
demands. For example, one leader believed that bankruptcy “would give us
clout, get us in position to survive, recover, all of that . . . [and n]ow we’re protected by the legal system so that people can’t take advantage of us.” 211
Another leader stated: “[W]e had a sense of hope and relief [upon filing]
because we felt we had a shot . . . . At least we weren’t going to just roll over

207
I define a “religious nonprofit” or “religious organization” as any organization whose operations are motivated in a meaningful way by faith-based principles. See generally Pamela Foohey,
Bankrupting the Faith, 78 MO. L. REV. 719 (2013) (discussing the differences between religious organizations and small businesses with respect to bankruptcy); Pamela Foohey, When Faith Falls
Short: Bankruptcy Decisions of Churches, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1319 (2015) [hereinafter Foohey, When
Faith Falls Short] (researching the bankruptcy decisions of churches through a series of interviews).
In conducting these interviews, I relied on a semi-structured interview protocol. See Pamela Foohey,
Lender Discrimination, Black Churches, and Bankruptcy, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1079, 1092–93 (2017)
[hereinafter Foohey, Lender Discrimination] (discussing interview methodology). Chapter 11 provides for the reorganization of a business. See U.S. COURTS, CHAPTER 11—BANKRUPTCY BASICS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics
[https://perma.cc/4YAJ-W9HJ] (discussing chapter 11).
208
To preserve anonymity, I identify each interviewee based on a randomly assigned interview
ID number. Interview scripts and transcriptions are on file with the author.
209
Foohey, When Faith Falls Short, supra note 207, at 1338–39.
210
For example, the leaders drew on the same psychological tactics to overcome bankruptcy’s
stigma and shame as consumer debtors interviewed by other scholars. Id. at 1352–59. Most of the
interviewed leaders were from organizations with predominately African American members, which
aligns with the demographics of the churches that have filed under chapter 11 over the last decade.
Foohey, Lender Discrimination, supra note 207, at 1090. In prior work, I argued that the disparity
between the demographics of churches and similar congregations nationwide that file bankruptcy
relates to inequalities in financial institutions’ lending practices to churches. See generally id. (discussing lender discrimination with respect to black churches).
211
Telephone Interview with Leader 159, at 4 (May 7, 2015) (original on file with author).
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and play dead. We were ready to fight.” 212 That pastor also discussed how the
church’s creditor had foreclosed on the church’s building, promoting a battle in
state court. The pastor had hoped that the state court would treat them fairly,
but did not believe this occurred. Moving to bankruptcy court, “federal court,”
as the pastor emphasized, would bring “justice” and “treat [the church] right,”
which included “our day in court.” 213 When the judge ordered the pastor to
mediate with the church’s creditor instead of hearing from church members in
court, the pastor perceived that to mean that the judge was denying the church
a voice in the proceeding: “We never get to tell our story . . . . What we wanted
was to come in there and have our day in court.” 214 The mediation resulted in a
plan that allowed the church to keep its building. Yet the church’s pastor still
believed that justice was not served, demonstrating the primacy of debtors’
perceptions about the procedural fairness over substantive outcomes.
Other leaders also spoke of longing to take part in the proceedings, even
if that merely meant being present in the courtroom: “I wanted to be there [in
court] every time. But I was advised that our presence wasn’t needed. I felt that
I would love to have been there to see the judge.” 215 Part of this leader’s desire
to be in court was “[t]o look in the face of our—not accusers—but our assassins, because I look at [creditors], I have no hate, I have no disdain, I feel sorry
for them.” 216 Another leader echoed this sentiment: “We really wanted to have
our day in court so that [the alleged wrongdoing on behalf of a bank employee]
could come out.” 217
In contrast, those leaders who had more positive experiences appeared before judges or at least attended hearings. One leader noted that “[the judge]
listened to all the information and I really liked him.” 218 Further, as found in
other legal contexts, a favorable outcome was not necessary to leaders’ perceptions that the bankruptcy process was fair. As one leader stated: “[The judge]
was fair and just. There were things that wouldn’t work. I mean, we didn’t win
every battle. We lost some of it. But that’s only because that’s the way it works
in the court of law.” 219
Overall, leaders’ comments evidence how some debtors experience the
bankruptcy process. Leaders looked for and expected proceedings to give them
a voice and help them resolve their organizations’ financial problems in a neu212

Telephone Interview with Leader 176, at 5 (Aug. 24, 2015) (original on file with author).
Id. at 5, 6, 9.
214
Id. at 6, 8.
215
Telephone Interview with Leader 55, at 8 (May 6, 2013) (original on file with author).
216
Id.
217
Telephone Interview with Leader 166, at 4 (June 23, 2015) (original on file with author).
218
Telephone Interview with Leader 161, at 5 (May 8, 2015) (original on file with author).
219
Telephone Interview with Leader 158, at 6 (May 6, 2015) (original on file with author).
213
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tral forum, even if the ultimate outcome was not what they had hoped for at the
outset.
These interviews support this Article’s theory that consumer debtors look
to bankruptcy for more than merely a discharge. They provide even more reason to theorize that if people have a voice during their bankruptcy cases, they
will be more likely both to experience the proceedings as fair 220 and to view
the outcomes as legitimate and as definitive statements on their social standing. 221 If so, they should be more likely to make the best use of the discharge
and to speak well of the bankruptcy system. If not, they may remain angry,
disgusted, guilty, and ashamed, 222 and more so than if they had the opportunity
to speak with the judge and their creditors. And this may hamper the bankruptcy system’s effectiveness, 223 negatively impacting how people re-enter the
credit economy, which, in turn, could affect how the credit economy functions.
With these harmful outcomes in mind, the next Part proposes two “new deals”
for debtors that alter consumer bankruptcy’s procedures with the goal of increasing its procedural justice. 224
III. A NEW DEAL FOR DEBTORS: REFORMING CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
TO PROVIDE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
This Article’s theory of consumer bankruptcy’s procedural justice has
normative implications for the system and advances our understanding of how
consumer bankruptcy works in action, on the ground. 225 That scholars previously have not linked procedural justice and expressive theories of law with
consumer bankruptcy likely relates to bankruptcy’s historical roots in criminal
law, the unique procedural posture of debtors simultaneously initiating cases
while asking for forgiveness, and the primacy of debates about bankruptcy’s
stigma to recent discussions about changing consumer bankruptcy laws. 226 In
particular, that debates have focused on bankruptcy’s stigma likely led scholars
to overlook the importance of research regarding how people can experience
their overindebtedness as a threat to their social status. This research, in large
part, animates the connection among procedural justice, expression through
participation in the legal system, and bankruptcy.
220

See supra notes 94–108 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 120–140 and accompanying text.
222
See supra notes 141–172 and accompanying text.
223
See supra notes 109–119 and accompanying text.
224
See infra notes 225–270 and accompanying text.
225
See Rebecca L. Sandefur, When Is Law in Action?, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 59, 59
(2016), https://kb.osu.edu/bitstream/handle/1811/76310/OSLJ_Furthermore_V77_059.pdf [https://
perma.cc/EE5Z-23CK] (noting the distinction between “law in the books” and “law in action”).
226
See supra notes 120–224 and accompanying text. See generally Kadens, supra note 203.
221
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Considering this research together also provides an insight into one longstanding question about who uses the consumer bankruptcy system. Filing
bankruptcy is largely a middle-class phenomenon. 227 Although middle-class
households are more likely to have asset and debt profiles that make bankruptcy a useful financial option, 228 their finances alone cannot fully explain why
middle-class households are overrepresented among consumer debtors.229 That
people expect the bankruptcy process to serve as a referendum on their social
status may especially encourage middle-class households to file, skewing the
people who file to those with middle-class backgrounds.
Turning to the theory’s normative implications, the foremost lesson from
the above analysis is that to enhance perceptions of consumer bankruptcy’s
procedural justice, debtors must have a more robust opportunity to interact
with decisionmakers. This Part proposes two ways to alter consumer bankruptcy to provide debtors with the chance to feel heard. 230 The proposal detailed in
Section A is modest, whereas Section B’s proposal re-envisions the system
more radically. In addition to providing debtors with more of a voice, both
proposals address other long-standing issues with the consumer bankruptcy
system that have hampered its ability to deliver the fresh start and help debtors
get back on their feet. 231
A. New Deal #1: Replacing the 341 Meeting with a Court Appearance
The first proposal for altering consumer bankruptcy’s procedures assumes
a goal of minimally changing current bankruptcy laws and processes while still
enhancing people’s perceptions of the system’s procedural justice. From a leg-
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See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
The ability to pay attorney’s and filing fees also likely factors into who ultimately files bankruptcy. See Foohey et al., “No Money Down,” supra note 48, at 1059 (discussing how some people
file a “no money down” chapter 13 case in which they pay zero dollars in attorney’s and filing fees
upfront and instead pay all fees through their chapter 13 plans, thus bypassing the need for sufficient
funds to pay fees at the time of filing); Mann & Porter, supra note 49, at 319–24 (investigating how
the timing of tax refunds and paychecks influences filing patterns).
229
There is no evidence that middle-class households are subject to garnishment orders at a higher rate than other households or that middle-class households receive more dunning from creditors
than other households. See Foohey et al., Sweatbox, supra note 17, at 249–54 (discussing debt collection).
230
See infra notes 232–270 and accompanying text.
231
Both of these proposals are meant to apply to consumer cases filed under chapter 7 and chapter 13 instead of business cases filed under chapter 7 or chapter 11, consumer cases filed under chapter
11, and consumer cases that accompany business filings. These cases are more procedurally and substantively complicated and, as such, in these instances debtors (or debtors’ management) already have
opportunities to appear before the bankruptcy judge. Whether these opportunities are adequate remains an open question.
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islative standpoint, this goal should make sense. A few small changes are easier to enact.
A straightforward “new deal for debtors” that promises to give consumers
more of the voice they likely crave is to substitute the 341 meeting for a court
appearance during which the bankruptcy judge questions the debtor. The appearance can happen in person, telephonically, via video conference, or
through an online interface. 232 This proposal requires only a few changes to
consumer bankruptcy’s procedures and to the Bankruptcy Code. 233 As a bonus,
it will address current issues with bankruptcy trustees’ payment and attorney’s
fees.
The court appearance will enable debtors to tell the story of their financial
troubles and to explain why they need a repayment plan or bankruptcy’s discharge to the ultimate judicial decisionmakers—bankruptcy judges. Judges, in
turn, can question debtors about their petitions, schedules, and other filings,
similar to what bankruptcy trustees presently do during 341 meetings. As an
added benefit, this procedure will allow judges to adjust their in-court and
written comments dynamically to account for what they are hearing and seeing. Consequently, debtors may perceive judges’ responses to them as richer,
bolstering their perceptions of bankruptcy’s procedural justice.
In addition, this procedure will replicate much of what currently happens
at 341 meetings, eliminating the need for these meetings, while also allowing
judges to assume some of trustees’ duties, particularly those of chapter 7 trustees. At present, trustees’ examinations of debtors during 341 meetings are crucial to the bankruptcy system’s functioning and integrity. 234 Often through no
fault of debtors, petitions, schedules, and other filings contain mistakes. 341
meetings allow trustees to identify errors and omissions. 235 Requiring judges to
question debtors will permit them to identify mistakes and omissions material
232
See generally AMY J. SCHMITZ & COLIN RULE, THE NEW HANDSHAKE: ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION (2017) (proposing an online remedy system to

expand consumers’ access to remedies).
233
See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2012) (requiring the 341 hearing).
234
See, e.g., Martha Hallowell & Elizabeth Ziegler, The Standing Trustee’s Critical Role in Section 341 Meetings of Creditors, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (2015), https://www.justice.gov/ust/file/nactt_
201509.pdf/download [https://perma.cc/CV5J-VDDU] (discussing trustees and 341 meetings); Cara
O’Neill, The Meeting of Creditors in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/341-meeting-creditors-chapter-13.html [https://perma.cc/P4PY-SLKA] (describing what to
expect at a 341 meeting); Bobby Wilbert, Debtor Who Failed to Disclose $5,000 in Lockbox Received
Discharge Since UST Failed to Show Requisite Intent, NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER BANKR. ATT’YS
(Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.nacba.org/debtor-failed-disclose-5000-lockbox-received-dischargesince-ust-failed-show-requisite-intent/ [https://perma.cc/9KBY-QRVZ] (detailing the story of how a
chapter 7 trustee found funds during a 341 meeting that led to the debtor amending its schedules to
disclose the additional property).
235
Based on my observations of 341 meetings, trustees tell debtors and their counsel in a minority
of cases to amend their schedules to account for small errors or omissions.
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to debtors’ cases. As with 341 meetings now, in most cases, if the judge or another party, such as a creditor, finds necessary corrections or amendments, the
debtor’s attorney can file revisions, to be reviewed by the judge.
Bankruptcy trustees still should have the opportunity to talk with debtors,
which can be achieved by allowing trustees to cross-examine debtors when
they appear. In allocating some of trustees’ current duties to judges, however,
trustees’ role necessarily will shift. Recall also that chapter 7 and chapter 13
trustees usually are private attorneys appointed by United States Trustees
(USTs), and that USTs’ responsibility is to monitor the efficiency and integrity
of the bankruptcy system. 236 To fulfill that duty, USTs may choose to review
any bankruptcy case, file motions, appear in court, and cross-examine debtors. 237 That USTs already play a role in policing the consumer bankruptcy system means that their obligations also can shift in light of a new procedure in
which judges have a more outwardly prominent role.
These shifts should result in a net benefit to the consumer bankruptcy system’s functioning, particularly in chapter 7 cases, in which compensation currently poses challenges for the private attorneys retained as trustees. At present, chapter 7 trustees are compensated in two ways. They receive $60 from
the debtors’ filing fee, 238 and they receive a sliding-scale commission based on
the non-exempt assets they identify and sell on behalf of the debtor’s creditors. 239 Because more than 90% of consumer chapter 7 cases are no asset, 240
trustees usually make $60 per filing. If the bankruptcy judge waives the filing
fee, the trustee makes nothing. 241 As a result, trustees have an incentive to aggressively look for non-exempt assets, even though they will make very little
in the vast majority of cases. Trustees make so little from administering chapter 7 cases that, on balance, they report losing money acting as trustees, 242
money they make up partly with the occasional asset case and partly by lever-
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See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
See 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2012) (describing the duties of the U.S. Trustee); Scott Riddle, The U.S.
Trustee Wants to Review My Case! Should I Be Worried?, GA. BANKR. LAW NETWORK, https://www.
gabankruptcylawyersnetwork.com/2014/09/the-u-s-trustee-wants-to-review-my-case-should-i-beworried/ [https://perma.cc/CNS9-L9RY] (discussing why a U.S. Trustee might review a case).
238
See Cara O’Neill, How Do Bankruptcy Trustees Get Paid?, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/
legal-encyclopedia/how-bankruptcy-trustee-paid.html [https://perma.cc/RN2L-FJVJ] (noting the flat
fee collected by chapter 7 trustees).
239
See id. (overviewing the chapter 7 trustee’s sliding scale commission on money collected from
selling assets).
240
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
241
See O’Neill, supra note 238 (discussing chapter 7 trustee compensation).
242
See Lupica, supra note 56, at 104–06, 109–10 (discussing how bankruptcy attorneys reported
losing money serving as chapter 7 trustees).
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aging their roles as trustees to get client referrals. In effect, at present, serving
as a chapter 7 trustee is a loss leader. 243
Because chapter 7 trustees are under extreme time and money constraints,
341 meetings run very short—an average of about ten minutes. 244 Trustees often time the meetings and strive to keep them as short as possible, occasionally
conducting a meeting in under three minutes. 245 But absent discussions with
their attorneys, 341 meetings are typically the only opportunities for people to
tell their stories of financial failure. In many instances, conducting these meetings so that debtors have sufficient opportunities to speak will require trustees
to devote much more time to each meeting and to alter or augment their typical
lines of questioning. Although trustees can organize 341 meetings such that
debtors will feel they have a voice, trustees’ current compensation structure
makes doing so infeasible. 246
With a revised procedure that places the burden of identifying debtors’
mistakes primarily on bankruptcy judges, chapter 7 trustees no longer will
have to spend hours reviewing cases and holding 341 meetings. Bankruptcy
judges, in part relying on their clerks, will take on many of those duties. This
should make the baseline of $60 that chapter 7 trustees make per case more
appropriate in light of the actual work required. If there exist assets to sell,
judges can order trustees to do so, and trustees can continue to collect the prescribed sliding scale commission from those sales. If a trustee suspects that the
debtor’s estate includes saleable assets, even if the petition and schedules suggest otherwise, the trustee can cross-examine the debtor to identify assets to
sell. And USTs can provide another check on chapter 7 cases, similar to their
current role. Cumulatively, debtors’ filings should receive the same scrutiny
while allowing them to appear and speak before the bankruptcy judge.
In contrast to chapter 7 trustees, even with a new procedure that requires
bankruptcy judges to examine debtors, chapter 13 trustees will need to retain
many of their current duties. At present, chapter 13 trustees’ primary responsibilities are to review proposed plans, recommend whether judges should approve plans, distribute payments made under plans, and monitor debtors’ ad243
See Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee Fees, BANKR. LAW NETWORK, http://www.bankruptcy
lawnetwork.com/chapter-7-bankruptcy-trustee-fees/ [https://perma.cc/X35F-Q3BB] (commenting on
why attorneys would serve as trustees); Riddle, supra note 237 (commenting that no asset cases are
“probably a loss leader”).
244
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
245
This observation comes from a post from July 2018 on a Facebook group for consumer bankruptcy attorneys in which a chapter 7 trustee posted pictures of timers, boasted that the trustee had
conducted three meetings under three minutes that afternoon, and asked for others to post the shortest
time it had taken them to conduct a 341 meeting. Screenshots of the original post are on file with the
author.
246
See supra notes 238–243 and accompanying text.
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herence to plans. 247 They also examine debtors at 341 meetings. 248 These duties are sufficiently time-consuming that serving as chapter 13 trustees comprises all or most of these private attorneys’ businesses. 249 Chapter 13 trustees
make money by taking a percentage of plan payments, up to 10%, as their
compensation. 250 It is common knowledge among bankruptcy practitioners that
this cut is enough to allow chapter 13 trustees to make low six-figure salaries
and to hire associate attorneys and staff. 251
Under the revised procedure, bankruptcy judges will assume the lion’s
share of chapter 13 trustees’ responsibilities in reviewing petitions and schedules so they can question debtors. Judges also may question debtors and their
attorneys about repayment plans, similarly lightening chapter 13 trustees’ load
in reviewing these plans. But the trustees’ primary role of collecting plan payments and monitoring debtors’ adherence to plans will remain. And, like chapter 7 trustees, chapter 13 trustees may want to cross-examine debtors about
petitions, schedules, and proposed plans.
Beyond speaking with a bankruptcy judge and trustee, some debtors may
want their creditors to be present when they appear in court. Compelling creditors to appear, however, presents problems. Most creditors will recover so little
in consumer bankruptcy cases, even if they are owed significant amounts of
money, that appearing in court will cost them more than the recovery they will
realize. 252 As presently conceived, bankruptcy trustees’ duties partly account
for creditors’ anticipated lack of participation. 253
Although some debtors initially may ask that their creditors be present,
creditor participation ultimately may not be necessary. Debtors will be able to
tell their stories to judges and trustees, the judicial officials who will decide
whether debtors receive the discharge or who will confirm their repayment
plans. In telling their stories, if necessary, debtors will be able to indict their
creditors or otherwise discuss their relationships with their creditors. Indeed,
the bankruptcy judge embodies the court as an institution issuing the ruling
that speaks to the debtors’ social standing. Debtors and the public should be
247
See generally EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. TRS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 13 STANDING TRUSTEES (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ust/legacy/

2015/05/05/Handbook_Ch13_Standing_Trustees_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8JD-HUQ2] (describing the duties of chapter 13 standing trustees).
248
See id. at 3–7; supra notes 31–54 and accompanying text.
249
See O’Neill, supra note 238 (discussing chapter 13 trustee compensation).
250
See id.
251
See Lupica, supra note 56, at 101–02 (discussing chapter 13 trustee compensation).
252
See Jiménez, supra note 35 (finding that 93% of people who filed under chapter 7 in 2007
entered bankruptcy with no distributable assets).
253
In chapter 11, the Code provides for the appointment of an official committee of unsecured
creditors to advance all unsecured creditors’ interests. 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (2012).
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most concerned with the legitimacy of the bankruptcy judge and the procedure,
not necessarily with whether debtors will be confronted by or be able to confront their creditors during the proceeding that supports this legitimacy. 254
Finally, this new procedure, of course, comes with costs. Replacing 341
meetings with court appearances will require debtors and bankruptcy courts to
invest more resources in the process. If they want to appear in person, debtors
will need to travel to federal courthouses, which in some circumstances will be
located more than a hundred miles from where debtors live. In contrast, 341
meetings are held at a greater number of locations and typically are closer to
debtors’ residences. Providing ways for debtors to appear telephonically, via
video, or through an online interface will defray these costs while preserving
the procedural justice benefits that accrue with the court appearance.
Debtors also will have to spend more time in court discussing their finances and their need for the discharge than they presently do in 341 meetings.
That people will spend more time telling their story is a feature of the new procedure, and likely integral to improving perceptions of consumer bankruptcy’s
procedural justice. But this may require people to take more time off from
work to travel and otherwise appear than they currently do to attend 341 meetings. Nonetheless, considering that procedural justice research shows that people value the opportunity to tell their stories, the time difference most likely is
not material to debtors, particularly with phone, video, or online appearance
options that reduce costs.
Debtors may be more worried about the additional fees that their attorneys almost certainly charge to represent them during court hearings, regardless of whether debtors’ appearances are in person or via technology. Consumer bankruptcy attorneys already face significant time demands relative to the
fees they charge their cash-strapped clients. 255 Of more concern for the new
procedure, almost all consumer bankruptcy attorneys require their clients to
pay all fees for assisting with chapter 7 cases prior to filing because of Code
provisions regarding payment of their fees. 256 As my CBP co-investigators and
I have discussed in prior work, these demands have resulted in attorneys creating a fee structure that seems to shift certain households from filing chapter 7
to filing chapter 13, despite chapter 7 being the better financial choice. 257 Any
addition to attorney’s fees may further affect households’ chapter choice decisions. Although attorneys still will need to charge more, in revising bankrupt254

See supra notes 94–108 and accompanying text.
See Lupica, supra note 56, at 117–21 (discussing attorneys’ reports about how much they
charge for chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases and how long they spend working on each case).
256
See Foohey et al., “No Money Down,” supra note 48, at 1066 (providing Code sections).
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See generally id. (discussing why debtors may be pushed by attorneys to file under a different
chapter than would be most effective for them).
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cy’s procedures, the Code sections governing attorney’s fees can be updated
simultaneously to allow debtors to pay fees over time. This is a more reasonable payment structure for cash-strapped debtors.
Bankruptcy judges also will need to devote more time to preparing for
and overseeing hearings, which will place monetary burdens on the bankruptcy
system. But if the consumer bankruptcy system is to deliver procedural justice
to debtors in the way it currently is conceived, these added costs are unavoidable. Besides, as a matter of fostering positive perceptions of the legal system,
the enhancement to the bankruptcy system’s integrity and effectiveness should
more than offset the extra investment.
B. New Deal #2: Transforming Consumer Bankruptcy into an
Administrative Proceeding
The second proposed “new deal for debtors” that promises to enhance
consumer bankruptcy’s procedural justice abandons the assumption that the
system’s current laws and process should remain as intact as possible. Although proposing a few smaller changes almost certainly is more legislatively
feasible in the short term, more radically reconfiguring the consumer bankruptcy system presents an efficient way to improve the system’s procedural
justice and effectiveness over the long term. Indeed, the first proposal with
minimal changes to existing procedure brings concerns about higher attorney’s
fees and additional burdens on the federal courts.
A way to navigate both of these concerns is to take cues from 341 meetings and from the history of the consumer bankruptcy system. Meeting locations are more widespread than bankruptcy courthouses, meaning that debtors
need to travel shorter distances. Meetings also are relatively short, though
presently too short. 258 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 259 which enacted
the present-day Bankruptcy Code (as updated by BAPCPA), dramatically altered the structure of the bankruptcy court system. Prior to the Code, under the
1898 Bankruptcy Act, 260 bankruptcy cases were adjudicated by bankruptcy
referees, who were overseen by district judges and courts. 261 Bankruptcy refer-
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See supra notes 238–245 and accompanying text.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1979). The Act became
effective as of October 1, 1979.
260
1898 Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
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See Douglas G. Baird, Blue Collar Constitutional Law, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 3, 12 (2012) (noting that at “[t]he end of the nineteenth century . . . modern bankruptcy came into being with its system
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ees were the equivalent of today’s bankruptcy judges, but with fewer powers. 262
For the purpose of reimagining consumer bankruptcy to enhance its procedural justice, the key takeaway from the bankruptcy referee system is that it
can be conceptualized as a hybrid of today’s bankruptcy courts and an administrative agency. In fact, at the same time as the referee system came into being, Congress was creating administrative agencies to oversee private disputes. 263 Instead of the system that eventually became the modern bankruptcy
courts, Congress could have put into place an administrative agency to oversee
bankruptcy cases, either both consumer and business cases or only consumer
cases. And, at present, the consumer bankruptcy docket looks more like that of
an administrative agency than a federal court. 264
Rather than take bankruptcy courts, bankruptcy judges, and the Code as
given, drawing from this history, the current consumer bankruptcy system can
be replaced with an administrative agency that runs administrative courts
which oversee the revised bankruptcy laws that govern consumer debtors’ discharges. 265 The agency’s exact contours and the accompanying laws are open
to development. But the agency, its process, and the “deal” offered to debtors
should include a few important elements.
Procedurally, the new system must engender feelings of trust and integrity
in debtors and the public. To achieve this, as procedural justice research teaches, debtors must have the opportunity to tell their stories of overindebtedness
to the ultimate decisionmakers overseeing the proceedings. This opportunity
can come in different forms—in person, via telephone or video conference, or
through an online interface.
For people who want to appear in person before the administrative court
officer, the agency can provide a hearing that operates very much like 341
meetings, but with the clear requirement that debtors have a sufficient chance
262
See Carl Felsenfeld, A Comment About a Separate Bankruptcy System, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
2521, 2524 (1996) (referring to referees as “the predecessors of today’s bankruptcy judges” and noting that referees were seen as “officer[s] of the court without independent judicial authority”).
263
See Baird, supra note 261, at 12 (using the Interstate Commerce Commission as an example of
administrative agencies formed at the same time the bankruptcy referee system was being discussed);
Felsenfeld, supra note 262, at 2523 (noting that “the United States is the only country with separate
bankruptcy courts”).
264
See Baird, supra note 261, at 15 (discussing bankruptcy court dockets’ similarity to administrative agency dockets); Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 386–87 (2012) (noting how bankruptcy courts are
anomalous).
265
As with the prior proposal, this idea is meant to apply to individuals and households that seek
to discharge some of the debts they accumulated primarily for household and personal use, not people
who run small businesses or who want the more flexible, albeit complicated, discharge through chapter 11. See supra note 231.
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to tell their stories. To address concerns about how far people must travel to
attend the hearings, they should be held in locations across the country, though
the administrative agency itself can have fewer offices nationwide.
In addition, replacing federal bankruptcy courts with an administrative
agency presents the opportunity to affirmatively encourage hearings conducted
by telephone or via video conference, which will reduce costs. It also allows
for the design of a system that relies heavily on online interfaces for people to
submit materials and write narratives, similar to the CFPB’s consumer complaint mechanism. 266 Courts across America increasingly use online interfaces
to facilitate the resolution of simple disputes, such as parking tickets, contract
issues, and some divorces. 267 These courts’ initiatives have proven to be costeffective and to increase people’s access to justice. 268 Updating consumer
bankruptcy’s technology is a natural extension of these initiatives that similarly
should enhance procedural justice.
The revised consumer bankruptcy system’s substantive laws must address
concerns about people’s ability to retain counsel and to understand how their
cases will proceed and how they will receive the discharge. Simplifying bankruptcy laws will make it easier for attorneys to represent debtors and for debtors to represent themselves, particularly combined with consumer-friendly
online interfaces to submit materials.
One way to reduce consumer bankruptcy’s substantive complexity is to
provide for only one chapter under which the typical consumer with household
debts can file. This chapter should collapse chapter 7 and chapter 13, retaining
each chapter’s most useful provisions and jettisoning troublesome elements.
Versions of this idea have been raised occasionally during the past several decades as scholars have exposed and confirmed flaws in the Code’s chapter 7 and
13 structure. 269 A single chapter can easily retain key elements of both chapters—a relatively fast discharge of unsecured debts and longer-term agreements for secured debts, such as houses and automobiles. 270
Ultimately, regardless of the exact changes to the consumer bankruptcy
system, the benefits of strengthening consumer bankruptcy’s procedural justice
should more than offset the costs of requiring consumers to appear in some
266

See supra notes 146–147 and accompanying text.
See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Expanding Access to Remedies Through E-Court Initiatives, 67
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way before the judicial official who will decide whether they receive the discharge. Procedural justice research, combined with what we know about the
people who turn to bankruptcy for help, strongly suggests that consumer debtors crave more of a voice during their bankruptcy cases. In turn, providing financially struggling households with richer opportunities to feel heard promises to strengthen people’s post-bankruptcy experiences and bolster their re-entry
into the credit economy.
CONCLUSION: TESTING BANKRUPTCY’S PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Across the legal system, people use legal procedures and outcomes to assess their value as members of society and to deal with the emotions arising
from serious events in their lives. Facing debts to the point of being unable to
repay absent a miracle is disastrous and a threat to people’s social identities.
Research regarding procedural justice and the expressive value of legal proceedings suggests that people want bankruptcy to provide a public referendum
that allows debtors to reaffirm their social standing (which has been tarnished
by their overindebtedness) and, relatedly, to cope with the negative emotions
arising from their financial situations and interaction with creditors.
Although some data exist in support of this Article’s theory of consumer
bankruptcy’s lack of procedural justice, to fully assess the hypotheses that underlie the theory, researchers must undertake more targeted empirical studies
of the system. These studies should involve people struggling with their debts
and assess the lived experience of overindebtedness, including how people
think about their creditors and the options they have to regain their financial
footing. Qualitative, semi-structured interview-based research, as has been undertaken in the context of bankruptcy’s stigma, 271 will likely provide useful
data to begin to understand what people think they will receive from bankruptcy’s procedures. Follow-up or separate studies similarly should ask debtors
after they have completed their bankruptcy cases whether bankruptcy’s procedures lived up to their expectations, and if not, about the effect of the disconnect between their expectations and reality.
Likewise, questionnaire-based studies drawing from pools of overindebted consumers and similar pools of non-indebted consumers should yield insights into people’s thoughts about dealing with overindebtedness and perceptions of bankruptcy’s procedures. As used to assess procedural justice and expressive theories of law in other contexts, these studies can employ hypothetical vignettes to reveal people’s thoughts and feelings. One of the keys to these
studies, of course, will be to identify groups of people to survey. Given the link
271
See generally Sousa, supra note 61 (conducting interviews with debtors regarding bankruptcy’s stigma); Thorne & Anderson, supra note 180 (noting that most debtors have a desire to pay).
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between debt collection pressures and people’s decisions to file bankruptcy,
state court debt collection proceedings offer a place to begin this research.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of understanding how people assess the fairness and legitimacy of the consumer bankruptcy system. The bankruptcy system is by far the part of the federal court system that people most
often use. We know very little about what people expect to gain from the bankruptcy process beyond the obvious financial benefits. Given that research
shows that people view the outcomes and proceedings of other parts of the legal system as referendums on their social status, people very likely view the
bankruptcy system, in part, as a place to assess and assert their social standing.
If consumer bankruptcy truly is procedurally bankrupt, then the “fresh start”
delivered through the discharge and through repayment plans is not as fresh as
presumed. This realization has important consequences for people’s return to
their communities and to the credit economy. It is crucial now to assess and
refine this Article’s theory of consumer bankruptcy’s procedural justice deficiencies, and then act to reform the deal that consumer debtors receive through
the bankruptcy system.

